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SECURITIES LAW DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION
THREATENED WITH BANKRUPTCY
Robert A. Fippinger*
I.

Introduction

As Finance Director of City X, Mr. Jones is an ex officio member of
the Electric Utility Board of City X. In this capacity he attends a
meeting of the board to approve a bond resolution, authorized the
previous evening by the City Council, providing for the issuance of
$20,000,000 of City X Electric Utility Revenue Bonds to improve and
repair distribution lines throughout City X. As bond counsel summarizes the bond resolution, Mr. Jones' mind wanders to a meeting he
has just attended in the Mayor's office during which advisors to the
Mayor discussed the necessity of City X filing a petition for municipal
debt adjustment under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 (Bankruptcy Code)' because of unexpected revenue shortfalls
and legal impediments to the issuance of revenue anticipation notes.
Without disclosing the possible filing of the petition, Mr. Jones votes
to approve the bond resolution, and the Board executes an underwriting agreement with its investment bankers. Has Mr. Jones and City X
or the investment bankers, upon a subsequent distribution of bonds to
investors, violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of3
1933 (1933 Act) 2 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)?
This illustration, with a few variations and additional details, provides the basis for discussing the interplay of disclosure requirements
under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act with the municipal debt adjustment
procedures of the Bankruptcy Code. The presentation is made in three
parts. First, the Article summarizes the application of federal secur-

* A.B. 1962, Duke University. M.A. 1963, Northwestern University. J.D. 1966,
University of Michigan. Ph.D. 1969, Northwestern University. Member of the New
York bar and partner of a law firm in New York City specializing in the law of public
finance.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (Supp. 11 1978). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78 kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
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ities law to public finance, that is, the issuance of securities by states
and political subdivisions. Second, it discusses specific problems under
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code that, in the circumstances illustrated, are likely to necessitate concern for the adequacy of disclosure
under the guidelines previously set forth. 4 Finally, the Article examines the disclosure requirements mandated by the Bankruptcy Code
itself and discusses the unresolved issues in the interaction of the
securities laws with Chapter 9.
II.

The Application of Federal Securities
Law to Public Finance

Congress enacted the 1933 Act to require full and fair disclosure of
the character of securities sold in interstate commerce or through the
mails and to prevent fraud in the sale of securities. 5 The operative
provisions of the 1933 Act are contained in a general antifraud provision in Section 17(a) 6 and a more limited registration provision in
Section 57 which, with its companion sections, provides a method of

4. It is not the author's intention to recommend that in the ordinary course of
public finance there be a standard disclosure paragraph as to the possible application
of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code where there is no foreseeable filing of a
petition. In most of the illustrations to be discussed, the Bankruptcy Code, properly
interpreted, adequately protects the investor and, therefore, the integrity of the
municipal market to the advantage of issuers. The analysis of Chapter 9 in the
illustrations becomes so complex, however, that the securities lawyer, the issuer and
other professionals inevitably will have to be sensitive to possible disclosure requirements.
5. 48 Stat. at 74.
6. § 17(a) of the 1933 Act is as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities by the use of any means or instruments of transporation or
communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly
or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77Q(a) (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). The registration provision of § 5 has three time periods:
(1) prior to filing a registration statement complying with § 7 of the 1933 Act filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), no offer to sell or buy a
security may be made, (2) during a 20-day waiting period, no communications with
respect to securities for which a registration statement has been filed with the SEC
may be made except by a prospectus meeting the requirements of § 10 of the 1933
Act, and (3) no sale may be made prior to the effective date.
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disclosure for many, but not all, issues of securities. Compliance with
Section 5 does not ensure compliance with Section 17(a).18
The registration requirements of Section 5 may be avoided if there
is no "security" to be sold within the meaning of Section 2(1),9 if the
security is an exempted security under Section 3 10 or the transaction is
exempted under Section 4.11 For public issuers the exemption from
registration is set forth in Section 3(a)(2).12 The exemption in Section
3(a)(2) includes securities issued by states, territories, political subdivisions, public instrumentalities or securities qualifying as industrial
development bonds under Section 103 of the Internal Revenue
Code.13 The defined entities become significant whenever it is neces8. See Cody, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
9. Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act is as follows:
[T]he term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of
the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1976).
10. Relevant clauses of § 3 are as follows:
(a) Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(2) Any security issued or guaranteed by the United States or any
territory thereof, or by the District of Columbia, or by any State of the
United States, or by any political subdivision of a State or territory, or by
any public instrumentality of one or more States or territories . . . or any
security which is an industrial development bond (as defined in section
103(c)(2) of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1954]) the interest on which is
excludable from gross income under section 103(a)(1) of [such Code] if, by
reason of the application of paragraph (4) or (6) of section 103(c) of [such
Code] (determined as if paragraphs (4) (A), (5), and (7) were not included
in such section 103(c)), paragraph (1) of such section 103(c) does not apply
to such security;...
15 U.S.C. § 77d (1976).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1976).
12. See note 10 supra.
13. I.R.C. § 103 (P-H 1981). Relevant provisions of §§ 103(a) and (b) of the
Internal Revenue Code include:
(a) General Rule-Gross income does not include interest on(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United
States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the
District of Columbia;. ..
(b) Industrial Development Bonds(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, any industrial development bond shall be treated as an obligation not described in subsection
(a). ..
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sary to cross-reference among the 1933 Act' 4 and 1934 Act, 15 the
(2) Industrial Development Bond-For purposes of this subsection, the
term 'industrial development bond' means any obligation(A) which is issued as part of an issue all or a major portion of the
proceeds of which are to be used directly or indirectly in any trade or
business carried on by any person who is not an exempt person (within the
meaning of paragraph (3)), and
(B) the payment of the principal or interest on which (under the terms
of such obligation or any underlying arrangement) is, in whole or in major
part(i) secured by any interest in property used or to be used in a trade
or business or in payments in respect of such property, or
(ii) to be derived from payments in respect of property, or borrowed money, used or to be used in a trade or business.
(3) Exempt person-For purposes of paragraph (2)(A), the term "exempt person" means(A) a governmental unit, or
(B) an organization described in section 501(c)(3) and exempt from
tax under section 501(a)..
(4) Certain exempt activities-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any
obligation which is issued as part of an issue substantially all of the
proceeds of which are to be used to provide(A) projects for residential rental property.
(B) sports facilities,
(C) convention or trade show facilities,
(D) airports, docks, wharves, mass commuting facilities, parking facilities, or storage or training facilities directly related to any of the
foregoing,
(E) sewage or solid waste disposal facilities or facilities for the local
furnishing of electric energy or gas,
(F) air or water pollution control facilities,
(G)facilities for the furnishing of water...,
(H) qualified hydroelectric generating facilities, .
(6) EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN SMALL ISSUES(A) In general-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any obligation issued
as part of an issue the aggregate authorized face amount of which is
$1,000,000 or less...
(D) $10,000,000 limit in certain cases.-At the election of the issuer,
. ..with respect to any issue this paragraph shall be applied(i) by substituting "$10,000,000" for "$1,000,000" in subparagraph
(A), and
(ii) in determining the aggregate fact amount of such issue, by
taking into account . .. the aggregate amount of capital expenditures
with respect to facilities described in subparagraph (E) [the municipality]
paid or incurred during the 6-year period beginning 3 years before the
date of such issue and ending 3 years after such date . ...
14. In the House Report accompanying the 1933 Act, H.R. REP. No. 85, 73rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1933), it was explained:
Paragraph (2) exempts United States, Territorial and State obligations, or
obligations of any political subdivision of these governmental units. The
term "political subdivision" carries with it the exemption of such securities
as county, town, or municipal obligations, as well as school district,
drainage district . . .The line drawn by the expression "political subdivi-
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and the Bankruptcy Code.1 7

sion" corresponds generally with the line drawn by the courts as to what
obligations of States their units and instrumentalities created by them, are
exempted from Federal taxation. By such a delineation, any constitutional
difficulties that might arise with reference to the inclusion of state and
municipal obligations are avoided. . . . (emphasis added).
15. Section 3(a)(9) of the 1934 Act defines "person" to mean "a natural person,
company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a
government." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1976). The definition is central to § 10(b) of the
1934 Act which provides:
SEC. 10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
SEC Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240 lOb-5 (1981). Prior to the 1975 Amendments to the 1934 Act, Pub.
L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975), the definition of "person" did not include governments, political subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, and in an action relating
to the 1974 New York City fiscal crisis, In Re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig. [1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97, 528 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1980), Judge
Owen held that municipalities prior to 1975 fell outside the scope of persons who
could be liable under the 1934 Act antifraud provisions.
16. The meaning of "political subdivisions" referred to in § 103(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code has been the subject of litigation, rulings and proposed regulations of
the Internal Revenue Service. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Shamberg's
Estate, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945), the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that The New York Port Authority was a political
subdivision for purposes of § 103(a). The Authority did not have the power of
taxation and its members were not elected, but the Authority was created by compact between New York and New Jersey, its members were appointed by the states, it
had the power of eminent domain, was imunized from suit, it had a police force with
traditional police powers and was empowered to enforce regulations governing the
operation of its facilities. See also Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Whit's
Estate, 144 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945), holding that
the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority was a political subdivision under § 103.
In Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. United States, 666 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1981), the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's determination that
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The reference in Section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act to Section 103 of the
Internal Revenue Code did not exist prior to 1970,18 and exemption
from registration was a simple matter of identifying the issuer as an
authorized government entity. No review of the purpose for which
In the 1960's, a number of
proceeds were to be used was necessary.'
subdivisions to issue
political
states had enacted legislation permitting
20
tax exempt revenue bonds for the purpose of attracting private
business to locate in the issuing county or municipality. Proceeds of
the bonds would be used to construct a plant which was leased or sold
to a private business in amounts and installments timed to coincide
with debt service on the bonds. The inducement to the company was
the lower interest rate for tax exempt bonds to finance a capital
improvement otherwise acquired by the issuance of corporate debentures or stock. From the perspective of the political issuer, provision
for employment opportunities had equal merit for the use of bonds as
the construction of roads. From the perspective of the SEC, the issue
was a disguised form of corporate debt which should be subject to the
same registration requirements as other corporate issues.
In 1968, the SEC took the position in proposed Rule 131,21 which
became effective in 1969, that bonds issued to benefit private corporations involved a "separate security" apart from the bond of the political subdivision. The SEC viewed the separate security as the obligation of the corporation under the lease or installment sale agreement

Temple University had sufficient governmental functions and powers to qualify as a
political subdivision. The Court of Appeals concluded that charges for tuition for
performing a recognized public service were not akin to tolls on bridges, id. at 838,
that campus police were not the equivalent of Port Authority police, id. at 840, that
the power to request the Commonwealth to condemn land was not similar to the
power of eminent domain, id., and that the private members of the Board of Trustees
were in a majority over those appointed by the Commonwealth, id. at 838. Temple
University was held not to be a political subdivision for purposes of § 103. Id. at 842.
17. Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code applies to "municipalities" (Bankruptcy
Code § 109(c)). "Municipality" is defined in § 101(29) to mean a "political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State;... " The confusion inherent in
this definition and the legislative history is discussed at notes 53-63 injra and accompanying text.
18. The additional clause in § 3(a) of the 1933 Act referring to § 103 of the
Internal Revenue Code was enacted by § 401 of the Empoyment Security's Amendments of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(2) (1976).
19. See note 11 supra.
20. A revenue bond is an obligation not payable from taxes but payable from
revenues generated by the project financed with proceeds of an issue, e.g., a toll
bridge. A general obligation bond is payable from taxes levied by the governmental
issuer and is likely to be used when the project financed does not generate sufficient
revenue to retire debt, e.g., a government office building.
21. 17 C.F.R. § 230.131 (1981).

1982]

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

to pay debt service. The obligation of the corporation was distinguished from the bond of the issuer and subject to registration.
In 1968, Congress itself took action to limit the use of public bonds
for private enterprise by enacting Section 103(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, since recodified as Section 103(b) .22 The term of art used
in the Internal Revenue Code is "industrial development bond" because the most prolific use of the device has been to attract heavy
industry. The definition, however, extends to any obligation in which
a major portion of the proceeds are used in the trade or business of any
person other than the government itself (or cetain charitable organizations) and a major portion of the debt service is payable from such
trade or business.2 3 Congress limited the use of industrial development bonds to certain identified purposes 24 deemed to provide sufficient public benefits to justify tax exempt financing. The SEC chose
not to follow the lead of Congress by repealing Rule 131. In 1970,
therefore, Congress specifically provided in Section 3(a)(2) that an
industrial development bond would not be subject to registration.2 5
The SEC has reacted to the additional clause in Section 3(a)(2) by
applying the cross reference to the Internal Revenue Code with a
vengeance. The pre-1970 provision in Section 3(a)(2) granting an
exemption from registration for political subdivisions and public instrumentalities remains intact. This general provision makes no reference to the Internal Revenue Code and yet in more than one hundred
no-action letters rendered by the SEC since 1970 interpreting Section
3(a)(2) the SEC has included a standard phrase that its favorable
interpretation is "contingent" upon the issue's achieving tax exempt
status under Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code.2 6 No attempt
is made to determine whether the issue is an industrial development
bond under Section 103(b), making the contingency with respect to
the Internal Revenue Code appropriate pursuant to congressional
policy in 1970. The broad language of Section 3(a)(2) is, as far as the
SEC is concerned, to be interpreted by the narrow language of Section
27
103 of the Internal Revenue Code.
22. I.R.C. § 103(b) (P-H 1981).
23. See note 13 supra.
24. See I.R.C. §§ 103(b)(4)-(6) (P-H 1981), note 13 supra.
25. See note 18 supra. Rule 131 remains in effect representing the position of the
SEC in situations not comprehened by Congress and continues to plague lawyers
relying on § 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act where there is any unique form of underlying
security not otherwise exempt under § 3 of the 1933 Act. See Fippinger, Public
Finance Law, ANN. Sunt. AM. L. (Vol. 4 1980).
26. See SEC No-ACTION LETTERS INDEX AND SUMMARIES (1933 ACT), Wash. Serv.
Bureau Inc. (1974).
27. The SEC has pursued its interest in the Internal Revenue Code by reviewing
the tax analysis of attorneys under § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code to argue that
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In the usual case where an issue of a political subdivision is exempt
from the registration requirements of Section 5 by reason of Section
3(a)(2), there is no basis for civil liability under Section 1128 with
respect to false statements or omissions in the registration statement.
Section 12(2)29 imposing civil liability in connection with prospectuses
and other communications specifically excludes securities exempt under Section 3(a)(2). What remains is Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act 30
which is the general antifraud provision. Section 17(a) clearly applies
to securities issued by political subdivisions by reason of Section
17(c). 3 1 Since liability cannot be effected under the civil liability
provisions of Sections 11 and 12, enforcement is accomplished by the
injunctive powers of the SEC under Section 20,32 the power to conduct hearings under Section 21 33 and the criminal sanctions under
Section 22.11

the tax analysis was incorrect thereby rendering an industrial development bond not
tax exempt and, in turn, subjecting the issue to registration under the 1933 Act and
defendants liable under the 1933 Act for failure to register. See generally SEC v.
Haswell [1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,156 (W.D. Okla. Oct.
19, 1977).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)(1)-77k(a)(4) (1976).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
30. See note 6 supra.
31. Section 17(c) provides that "[t]he exemptions provided in § 3 [77c] of this title
shall not apply to the provisions of this section." 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(c) (1976).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1976).
33. Id. § 77u.
34. Id. § 77x. The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether there is an implied
civil liability under § 17(a). In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975), the Court stated: "We express no opinion on whether § 17(a) in light of the
express civil remedies of the 1933 Act gives rise to an implied cause of action." Id. at
734 n.6. In a similar statutory provision, § 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of
1940, the Court in 1979 held there was no implied cause of action. Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). In his concurring opinion in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1005 (1971), Judge Friendly stated:
[t]here is unanimity among the commentators, including some who were
in a peculiarly good position to know, that § 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Actindeed the whole of § 17-was intended only to afford a basis for injunctive relief and, on a proper showing, for criminal liability, and was never
believed to supplement the actions for damages provided by §§ 11 and 12.
[citations ommitted]. When the House Committee Report listed the sections that 'define the civil liabilities imposed by the Act' it pointed only to
§§ 11 and 12 and stated that '[t]o impose a greater responsibility [than that
provided by §§ 11 and 12] . . . would unnecessarily restrain the conscientious administration of honest business with no compensating advantage to
the public.' H.Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933).
Id. at 867. For the argument that an implied cause of action should not arise under
either § 17(a) of the 1933 Act or § 10(b) of the 1934 Act in the context of municipal
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The standard of conduct required by Section 17(a) is the same for
issues of securities by political subdivisions as for issues of private
corporations. Sections 17(a) (1) 35 refers to "devices," "schemes" and
"artifices to defraud." This is language of intent and a showing of
scienter is required in an enforcement action by the SEC . 36 Scienter
is defined by the courts to be a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud. 37 Sections 17(a)(2) and (3)38 employ
language which relates to the effect of the conduct rather than the
a negligence standard
intent of the defendant. Under these provisions
39
will support injunctive action by the SEC.
A better argument may be made under Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act 40 for implied liability in issues of securities by political subdivisions, given the absence of tightly drafted civil remedies in the 1934
Act comparable to Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act. 4' Throughout
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act there is language referring to "devices,"
"contrivances" and conduct that is "manipulative." Accordingly, an
action under Section 10(b), whether for damages or injunctive relief,
requires a showing of scienter. 42 Where there is an identifiable primary party committing the securities law fraud, peripheral persons
referred to by the courts as "aiders and abettors" will be subject to
Section 10(b) liability if the aider and abettor had knowledge of the
violation and rendered substantial assistance in the achievement of the
primary violation. 43 The courts have interpreted this test in the form
of substantial
of correlative variables: where there is little showing
44
assistance the degree of knowledge must be greater.
The concept of materiality appears throughout the antifraud provisions. It is unnecessary to disclose information for the sake of providing additional information. What is material is that which, in the

finance, see Schwarz, Municipal Bonds and the Securities Laws: Do Investors have
an Implied Private Remedy?, 7 SEC. REG. L. J. 119 (1979). In a recent case involving
industrial development bonds, the District Court for Kansas found no implied liability under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act but held there could be civil liability under § 10(b)
of the 1934 Act. Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburg, Kansas, Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 1270 (D. Kansas 1980).
35. See note 6 supra.
36. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
37. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
38. See note 6 supra.
39. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
40. See note 15 supra.
41. Woods, 489 F. Supp. at 1270.
42. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980).
43. lIT, An Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
44. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975).
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context of all information disclosed, would assume actual significance
in the deliberations of a reasonable investor. 45 This standard may be
clarified by highlighting the elements of the definition. First, the
information to be evaluated for materiality must be considered in the
context of all material information, not in isolation. 4 Second, it must
assume actual significance in an investment decision. 47 Third, it also
must assume actual significance to an objectively reasonable investor,
not a unique investor with a particular, specialized interest. 48 If information is not material, it need not be disclosed. Conversely, if disclosure of immaterial information would confuse that which is material,
it should not be disclosed.
Returning to Mr. Jones and City X, the possibility of filing a petition for municipal debt adjustment is clearly material since there
would be an immediate impact on the secondary market for all City X
obligations. Furthermore, the terms of repayment could be affected
under the procedures of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 Mr. Jones and City
X would be subject to civil liability under Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act for having actual knowledge of the material omission. Mr. Jones
and City X also would be subject to injunctive procedures by the SEC
under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.
The investment banker, however, lacking actual knowledge of the
fraud, would not be liable under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 50 The
investment banking firm and the responsible employee could be subject to injunctive action by the SEC under Sections 17(a)(2) or (3) of
the 1933 Act where the standard of care is based on negligence and not
on actual knowledge .5 The investment banker's negligence is due to
his failure to analyze the financial condition of the issuer to acquire
sufficient information which could cause him to question the solvency
2
of City X.5

45. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 448-49.
48. Id. at 449.
49. See Part III infra.
50. See IIT, An Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 923-25 (2d Cir. 1980).
51. For a discussion of the negligence standard as applied to aiders and abettors
under § 17(a), see SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973).
52. For investment bankers as well as attorneys attempting to have a practical
definition of "due diligence", a valuable guide is the American Bar Association's
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 335, 60 A.B.A.J.
488 (1974):
[t]he lawyer should, in the first instance, make inquiry of his client as to
the relevant facts and receive answers. If any of the alleged facts, or the
alleged facts taken as a whole, are incomplete in a material respect or are
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A.

Chapter 9 of The Bankruptcy Code

The Securities Law Problem of Identifying
the Bankruptcy Code Debtor

The immediate reaction of Mr. Jones and City X on being informed
of possible violations of the federal securities laws might well be to
argue that the bondholders are unaffected not only because there was
full and adequate disclosure with respect to the electric system, but
also because revenues of the system are sufficient to pay debt service.
In order to consider this argument, it first must be determined
whether the debt is owed by City X, which is about to file a Chapter 9
petition, or by the Electric Utility Board of City X, a separate political
subdivision which is not threatened by bankruptcy. If this is the debt
of City X, the second issue to be considered is whether a plan of
adjustment may lawfully be approved by the bankruptcy court if it
impairs the security of bondholders.
Considering the first issue, a municipality entitled to file a petition
under Chapter 9 is defined as a "political subdivision or public agency
or instrumentality of a State." ' 53 The legislative history5 4 indicates
that the definition was derived from the municipal bankruptcy
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act enacted in 1976. 55 A 1976 House
Report dealing with the municipal bankruptcy amendment provides
that the definition "is not meant to be limiting language ...
"56 The
report further explains that the requirement that the state approve the
filing of a petition 57 is to ensure that the proceeding be a cooperative
one between the state and the bankruptcy court. 58 It also is clear from
the legislative history that the definition of a political subdivision and
a public agency or instrumentality is to be derived from state law.
This conclusion was applied in In Re Fort Cobb, Oklahoma, Irrigation Fuel Authority, 59 where a federal court dismissed a Chapter 9

suspect, or are inconsistent or either on their face or on the basis of other
known facts are open to question, the lawyer should make further inquiry. .

.

. Where the lawyer concludes that further inquiry of a reason-

able nature would not give him sufficient confidence as to all the relevant
facts, . . . he should refuse to give an opinion.

Likewise, the investment banker should refuse to underwrite an issue. Id. at 489.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (29) (Supp. 11 1978).
54. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 312 (1977).
55. Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 84, 90 Stat. 315 (1976).
56. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 557 (1976).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1978) (formerly § 84).
58. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 545 (1976).
59. [Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. 67,102 (Mar. 27, 1979).
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petition for failure of the petitioner to qualify as a political subdivision
under state law. This principle illustrates an important distinction
between the interpretation of similar language in the Bankruptcy
Code and Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code,60 where the
definition of a political subdivision has been federalized and made
overly simplistic. 6' Whether the Bankruptcy Code debtor is City X or
the Utility Board is a matter of state law.
By relying on state law definitions of political subdivisions and
public agencies and instrumentalities, the Bankruptcy Code draws on
two centuries of jurisprudence delineating the public and private
sectors of the economy. In most jurisdictions, the term "political
subdivision" refers to all government bodies below the level of the
state, including counties, municipalities, districts, agencies, authorities, quasi-corporations and other "bodies politic and corporate"
which have a sufficiently separate identity under state law.6 2 The
phrase "political" in political subdivision or "body politic and corporate" and the phrase "public" in public agency or public instrumentality also have historical significance. In early American law, corporations had both the sovereign powers of what are now public
corporations and the profit-oriented rights of what are now private
corporations. The monopolistic use of such power for the attainment
of private wealth led to the separation in the early nineteenth century
of public and private functions. 6 3 While the boundaries of legitimate
activity for the two sectors have varied with the vicissitudes of political and economic philosophy, as far as Chapter 9 of the current
Bankruptcy Code is concerned, the historical and functional attributes
of the term "political subdivision" relate to the overriding purpose of
Chapter 9, as distinguished from the operative chapters of the Bankruptcy Code which deal with private persons and corporations. In
Chapter 9 there is no liquidation of the assets of the municipality as in
Chapter 7, nor is there the creation of a fictional estate of the debtor
overseen by a trustee as in the provisions of Chapter 11 applicable to
business reorganizations. Chapter 9 contemplates the maintenance of

60. I.R.C. § 103 (P-H 1981).
61. See note 16 supra. To be a § 103 political subdivision pursuant to Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank v. United States, it virtually is necessary to have the power of eminent
domain and a police force with the ability to shoot to kill. The possible assignment by
state legislatures of a myraid of public functions to various public entities is ignored.
The only meaningful criterion mentioned in the case is state control of membership
on the board of the entity.
62. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 34.
63. Frug, The City As A Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980).
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public property for public purposes as well as decisions made by
public officials, not by private trustees.
Returning to the illustration of City X, the facts indicate that the
debt is a debt of the city and not the Electric Utility Board. The bond
resolution was adopted by the City Council and the bonds are revenue
bonds of City X. The board appears to be an agency of the city and
probably has a partially separate identity under a state statute authorizing the creation and governing the operations of electric utility
boards in cities of a certain size. Although the membership and
powers of the board are determined by state legislation, the board still
would be an agency of City X. The debt incurred for the electric
system is debt of City X and therefore necessarily within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court overseeing the petition and plan of
City X.
An entirely different analysis would result if state law created a
separate political subdivision to operate the electric system. For example, a statute could provide, "[i]n every city of the first class there
hereby is established an authority to be designated the Electric Utility
Authority of the City, constituting a political subdivision of the state
and body politic and corporate with the following powers .....
In
such a case, the imminent bankruptcy of City X might be wholly
immaterial as a matter of securities law to the issuance of debt by the
authority. The plan of debt adjustment of City X could not affect the
debt of the authority which would be a separate political subdivision.
In this instance, the only argument for disclosure of the peril of City X
would be the possible secondary market effect on the bonds of the'
authority.
The legislative history and explanatory comments to the Bankruptcy Code exclude industrial development bonds from the scope of
the petition and plan. Therefore, this particular form of indebtedness
is beyond the jurisdiction of the court.6 4 The Senate Report states
that industrial development bonds are issued to provide financing at
lower tax exempt interest rates in order to construct facilities for
privately owned companies. 65 Furthermore, they are sold on the
basis of the credit of the company and are payable solely from payments made by the company.66 The municipality is merely a financing vehicle to enable the bonds to be sold on a tax exempt basis under

64. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 109, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5895.

65. Id.
66. Id.

CODE
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Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code. 7 Bankruptcy Code claims
in connection with industrial development bonds are claims against
the company and not the municipality and, therefore, are deemed
debts of the company.6 8 A municipal plan of adjustment would
exclude industrial development bonds.69
The congressional attempt, while motivated by good intentions, is
unsuccessful in its execution. By referring specifically to an industrial
development bond as defined in Section 103 of the Internal Revenue
Code, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code adopts the meanings set forth in the Internal Revenue Code. For example, assume City
X issues $20,000,000 of Electric Utility Revenue Bonds, the proceeds
of which are used to provide $10,000,000 of improvements to transmission facilities which will benefit the general public and
$10,000,000 of improvements to its hydro-electric generating plant
which would increase the output to be sold to an investor-owned
private utility serving a recently annexed area of the city. To secure
the bonds, a reserve fund is established with electric system surpluses
on hand in the amount of $2,000,000. Although under the Internal
Revenue Code this is an industrial development bond, should the issue
be deemed solely a debt of the investor-owned utility and not of City
X for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code?
The problem is more clearly exposed in the following issues. On the
same day, City X issues $10,000,000 of Hospital Revenue Bonds to
70
loan money to a private hospital organized under Secstion 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code and $10,000,000 of Housing Development Revenue Bonds to provide funds to make ten $1,000,000 loans to
developers to finance the construction of apartment buildings for
occupancy by persons of low and moderate income. 7' The first issue
is not an industrial development bond and, therefore, should be subject to a Chapter 9 plan. The second issue is an industrial development
bond and, therefore, should fall outside the scope of Chapter 9. But

67. Id.
68. Id. at 109-10.
69. For the provisions of I.R.C. § 103 relating to industrial development bonds,
see note 13 supra.
70. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (P-H 1981).
71. The analysis under I.R.C. § 103(b) is that the second issue is the making of
loans to developers for use in the trade or business of the developers in the construction business. The first issue, while a loan to a private corporation, is a loan to an
"exempt person" under I.R.C. § 103 (b)(3) by reason of the hospital being organized
under I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3). The language of I.R.C. § 103 (b) provides that the
Hospital Revenue Bonds are not industrial development bonds. See note 13 supra.
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this result would be the very opposite of what Congress intended
when it enacted Chapter 9.
The purpose of Chapter 9 is to avoid liquidation of the assets of the
governmental entity and to allow elected officials to continue to perform governmental services without the interposition of an appointed
trustee. Claims are to be restructured in the manner of a Chapter 11
corporate reorganization rather than a Chapter 7 liquidation and
there is to be government management of public affairs by those
elected to office. There is no estate created to be administered by a
trustee. The Hospital Revenue Bond issue is the mere lending of
money to a private corporation and requires little, if any, governmental supervision but is within Chapter 9. The legislative history would
make an obligation that is in reality an obligation of a private corporation within the jurisdiction of the Chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment.7 2 The Housing Development Revenue Bonds, theoretically outside Chapter 9, are for a purpose requiring continued government
oversight to protect the interests of tenants in the construction and
management of the apartments. If the developers become bankrupt,
the Chapter 9 function is lost because the issue is not within the
protection of Chapter 9. When a developer becomes bankrupt, the
municipality is in the position of creditor making a claim, and the
developer is replaced by a trustee. If both the municipality and the
developer are insolvent, the municipality would be a Chapter 7, 11 or
13 claimant, as opposed to a Chapter 9 debtor, making it difficult for
the municipality to act in the best interests of both the tenants and the
municipality.
If a municipality faces any risk of becoming insolvent, the officials
and advisors responsible for a revenue bond issue are left with the
difficult problem of determining whether the issue would be within
the sope of Chapter 9. The analysis is all the more difficult when the
definitional reference to Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code is
added, leading to a result that is inconsistent with the underlying
purpose of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. Under the federal
securities laws, the identity of a potential Bankruptcy Code debtor,
which defines the scope of juirisdiction of the bankruptcy court in
confirming a plan of debt adjustment, is essential to a determination
of material disclosures.
B. The Circularity of Constitutional Issues
The term "bankruptcy" is a misnomer for a Chapter 9 proceeding.
The purpose of Chapter 9 is to provide for federal court supervision of
72. See note 64 supra.
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a settlement between the petitioner municipality and a majority of its
creditors. Assets of the municipality cannot be liquidated to satisfy
creditors. Therefore, the purpose of the plan must be to adjust outstanding debts to creditors by restructuring or refinancing so that the
cash flow of the municipality is sufficient to pay adjusted debt as it
comes due.

73

A municipal adjustment suit may be commenced by the political
subdivision alone; it is a voluntary petition, not an involuntary
case.7 1 In addition to requiring voluntary commencment by the political subdivision, the Bankruptcy Code requires as a precondition to
the filing of a petition that there be affirmative authorization under
state law. 75 The requirement of state consent is included in the
operative provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, but Section 903 further
provides a general rule of interpretation that Chapter 9 "does not limit
or impair the power of a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a
municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the political or
governmental powers of such municipality .... 71
Section 903 was a result of the interplay between Congress and the
Supreme Court during the Depression. The first municipal debt provisions included in the Bankruptcy Act were enacted in 1934 as emergency legislation for the relief of minor political subdivisions of
states.7 The statute was declared unconstitutional on its face by the

73. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 543 (1976).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (Supp. I 1978), adopts 11 U.S.C. § 301 into Chapter 9
providing for voluntary cases, but there is no adoption of 11 U.S.C. § 303, the basis
for an involuntary case. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) (Supp. H 1978), provides that to be a
debtor under Chapter 9, the entity must be one which "desires to effect a plan to
adjust such debts."
75. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (Supp. II 1978). State consent is illustrated by the

following Florida statute,

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 218.01 (West 1971):

For the purpose of rendering effective the privilege and benefits of any
amendments to the bankruptcy laws of the United States that may be
enacted for the relief of municipalities, taxing districts and political subdivisions, the state represented by its legislative body gives its assent to, and
accepts the provisions of any such bankruptcy laws that may be enacted by
the congress of the United States for the benefit and relief of municipalities, taxing districts and political subdivisions and its several municipalities, taxing districts and political subdivisions, at the discretion of the
governing authorities thereof, may institute and conduct and carry out, by
any appropriate bankruptcy procedure that may be enacted into the laws
of the United States for the purpose of conferring upon municipalities,.
taxing districts and political subdivisions, relief by proceedings in bankruptcy in federal courts.
76. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (Supp. II 1978).
77. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 345, §§ 78-80, 48 Stat. 798.
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Supreme Court.78 The following year Congress enacted a statute that
would not impinge upon the constitutionally protected authority of
the states to regulate the affairs of their political subdivisions. 79 This
statute was upheld by the Supreme Court. s0 In upholding the legislation the Court warned that "no interference with the fiscal or governmental affairs of a political subdivision is permitted. "' 8'1 The current
legislative history explaining Section 903 retains this constitutional
2
theme. s
The following hypothetical illustrates the constitutional issues involved. The Electric Utility Authority of City X is organized under
state law as an authority and a body politic and corporate separate
and apart from City X. The Electric Utility Authority is, therefore,
the relevant debtor for Bankruptcy Code analysis. In the statute creating the authority there is a standard provision designed to protect the
security of revenue bondholders: "In consideration of the bondholders
purchasing bonds of the authority the state does hereby covenant with
the bondholders that it will not interfere with or permit interference
with the covenants of the authority with bondholders set forth in a
bond resolution or trust indenture." The bond resolution or trust
indenture contains the following customary covenant of the authority:
"The authority specifically covenants that it will not permit the extension of the maturity of any bond or the change in any interest rate or
redemption provisions of any bond without the express consent of the
bondholder." Meanwhile, the state enacts a law authorizing all of its
political subdivisions to file a petition for adjustment of debt under
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. 83 With rising costs of fuel and
declining electricity use, the authority finds itself unable to pay debt
service on time and files a petition for Chapter 9 adjustment after
consultation with major institutional investors. A minority bondholder intervenes, claiming that the authority has no power to file the
petition.
The minority bondholder could argue that the statutory covenant of
the state combined with the specific covenant of the authority is a
78. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513
(1936).
79. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653.
80. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
81. Id. at 49-51.
82. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 397-98 (1977): "[ § 903] sets forth the
primary authority of a State, through its constitution, laws, and other powers, over
its municipalities .... In light of the recent Supreme Court case, National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), maximum flexibility for the States in solving
the debt problems of their municipalities is advisable."
83. For typical statutory language, see note 75 supra.
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contract that there will be no debt adjustments under the Bankruptcy
Code and cite the contract clause of the United States Constitution in
support of his position.8 4 The authority, on the other hand, could cite
the power of Congress to enact uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States 5 and the supremacy clause of the
Constitution" to support its position that the Bankruptcy Code supercedes the statutory covenant. This apparent conflict of constitutional
issues is not a circularity problem incapable of resolution once the
basic policy of Chapter 9 is accepted-the states have the primary
87
power over the fiscal affairs of political subdivisions.
Rather than looking for problems at the constitutional level, attention should be directed toward resolving the apparent conflict between the state statutes.8 8 According to the principles of statutory
construction, when one statute deals with a subject in general terms
and another with the same subject in a more detailed way, the latter
will control the former if the two cannot be read together.8 9 The
statute authorizing all the state's political subdivisions to file a petition
for adjustment ° is a general statute."' The statute creating the authority and containing the statutory covenant is a permitted special
act. 2 The two may be harmonized by concluding that as a general
principle political subdivisions in the state may file a petition for debt
adjustment, but the state has determined that electric utility authorities may be outside the general consent when the authority, in order to
induce investors to purchase bonds, agrees not to file a petition under
Chapter 9 pursuant to its covenants with bondholders. The combination of the bond resolution or trust indenture covenant with the
statutory covenant operates to take the authority out of the general

84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1: "No State shall ... pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts ......
85. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4.
86. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."
87. 11 U.S.C. §§ 903, 904 (Supp. 11 1978).
88. This conforms to the abstention doctrine that if a case can be decided on either
of two grounds, one involving a constitutional issue and the other an issue of statutory construction, the court will decide only the latter. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
89. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.05 (4th ed.).
90. See note 75 supra.
91. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 40.02, 40.08 (4th ed.).
92. See, e.g.. Monterey Peninsula Airport Dist. v. Mason, 19 Cal. 2d 446, 121
P.2d 727 (1942).
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consent to file a petition. Remedies on default will then be determined
statute
pursuant to the bond resolution or trust indenture, the state
93
state.
the
of
laws
relevant
other
and
authority
the
creating
C.

Commencement of the Action and the Automatic Stay

An action under Chapter 9 is commenced by the municipality's
filing a petition in the bankruptcy court in any district in which the
municipality is located. 9 4 The chief judge of the court of appeals for
that circuit designates the bankruptcy judge to conduct the proceedings.9 5 In order to file the petition, the Chapter 9 debtor must be a
municipality," have approval of the state,9 7 be insolvent or unable to
meet debts as they mature,98 and have attempted to negotiate with
99
creditors or determined that such negotiations are impracticable.
The filing of the petition, evidenced by the time stamp of the court
clerk, acts to invoke the automatic stay provisions of Sections 362100

93. There are other constitutional issues affecting political subdivisions that have
yet to be resolved under the Bankruptcy Code. For example, Congress in § 106
gratuitously waives sovereign immunity for states and political subdivisions and the
sweeping jurisdiction given to bankruptcy courts in § 105 has not gone unnoticed. See
generally Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionalityof the
Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 MagistrateAct, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 560 (1980).
94. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 301 (Supp. 1 1978). The reference to "any district" is to
provide for municipalities located in more than one federal district such as New York
City.
95. Id. § 921(b). The involvement of the chief judge of the court of appeals is
because a municipal adjustment is likely to be comparable to a major business
reorganization requiring perhaps years of time, considerable publicity, and, therefore, the possibility of bankruptcy judges attempting to manipulate the schedules to
secure the assignment.
96. Id. § 109(c)(1).
97. Id. § 109(c)(2).
98. Id. § 109(c)(3). A municipality is insolvent if it is unable to pay debts as they
mature. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1978).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5) (Supp. I 1978), requires that the municipal debtor:
(A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority
in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair
under a plan in a case under such chapter;
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain
the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the
claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a
case under such chapter;
(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is
impracticable; or
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a preference.
100. Id. § 362.
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and 922.101 The stay arises by operation of law and requires no action
by the bankruptcy court. It halts the collection of claims, prevents
creditors from pursuing remedies against the debtor's assets to the
detriment of other creditors, and precludes certain harassing techniques to which the typical bankrupt is subjected. Section 362(a)
refers to eight activities which are immediately prevented by the filing
of the petition:
(1) judicial, administrative or other proceedings against the
debtor including the serving of process;
(2) enforcement of a judgment against the debtor;
(3) any act to obtain property of the debtor;
(4) any act to create, perfect or enforce a lien against property of
the debtor;
(5) any act to create, perfect or enforce a lien against the
debtor's property securing a prepetition debt;
(6) any act to collect, assess or recover a prepetition claim
against the debtor;
(7) set-off of any prepetition debt owing to the debtor against
any claim of the debtor; and
(8) a proceeding by the debtor before the United States Tax
Court. 102

Under paragraphs (4) and (5) the automatic stay prohibits the
creation and perfection, as well as the enforcement, of any liens even
though the claim arose prior to the filing of the petition. The implications of these provisions for public finance are apparent when applied
to the original illustration.
The City Council of City X adopts a bond resolution authorizing
the issuance of Electric Utility Revenue Bonds of City X. The bonds
are issued to finance electric transmission and distribution lines for a
designated portion of the city. The city further adopts a rate ordinance providing for utility rates and charges by customers in amounts
sufficient to pay operating expenses and debt service as well as providing for reserves. The bond resolution appoints a trustee and requires
that all revenues (defined to be the rates and charges) will be deposited, as soon as practicable upon receipt by the trustee, in a trust fund.
The bond resolution further provides: "To secure the payment
of the bonds, the city hereby pledges to the bondholders all revenues
held or set aside or to be held or set aside under the bond resolution.
The pledge hereby made shall be valid and binding from and after the
101. Id. § 922. Congress determined that the automatic stay under § 362 is
incomplete for a municipality and therefore added a stay of actions against municipal officers or inhabitants.

102. Id. § 362(a).
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first delivery of bonds, and the revenues so pledged shall immediately
be subject to the lien of the pledge without any physical delivery or
further act." The city issues the bonds, constructs the project, and
begins collecting revenues from customers when it files a petition
under Chapter 9. The city immediately stops paying the fees and
charges to the trustee, and the trustee telephones the Finance Director
requesting payment. The Finance Director unhesitatingly informs the
trustee that the trustee's telephone call has violated the automatic
stay, 10 3 and that the city has no intention of making payments to the
trustee because the trustee is attempting to perfect the lien of the
pledge by causing delivery of the fees and charges.
A pledge is a security interest in a physical object capable of deliv04
ery, created by another party's possession of the object. 1 Typically,
a pledge to secure a debt or performance of an act is created by the
pledgor delivering the object to the pledgee. 0 5 A contract to pledge,
unaccompanied by delivery, does not in itself create a pledge but does
create an equitable interest. 106 At common law the idea of a perfected pledge is without meaning; the pledge either exists or it does not
exist. 107 Without using the term "pledge," Section 9-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides that a security interest in
letters of credit, goods, instruments, money, negotiable documents or
chattel paper may be perfected by the secured party's taking possession of the collateral.' 0 8 The security interest is perfected from the
time possession is taken without relation back. 10
The Finance Director appears to have a firm basis for diverting
revenues to purposes other than the payment of debt service while the
stay is in effect. If he were correct, however, securities lawyers might
103. A telephone call is an "act" which 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. I 1978), is
designed to prevent since many of the harassing techniques of collection agencies are
conducted by telephone.

104.

RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §

1 (1941).

105. Id. § 5.

106. Id. § 101(2).
107. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

108. Id. § 9-305.

CODE

§

9-305 comment 1, 3 U.L.A. 427 (1981).

109. Official Uniform Comment 3 to UCC § 9-305 states:
[t]he Section rejects the 'equitable pledge' theory of relation back, under
which the taking possession was deemed to relate back to the date of the
original security agreement. The relation back theory has had little vitality
since the 1938 revision of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, which introduced
in Section 60(a) provisions designed to make such interests voidable as
preferences in bankruptcy proceedings. This Section now brings state law
into conformity with the overriding federal policy: where a pledge transaction is contemplated, perfection dates only from the time possession is
taken, although a security interest may attach, unperfected, before that
under the rules stated in Section 9-204.
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feel obligated to make a disclosure of law even where insolvency of the
issuer is not imminent. There are several bases for concluding that the
Finance Director was incorrect.
First, Section 9-104(e) of the official text of Article 9 of the UCC
provides that Article 9 has no application to a transfer by a government, a governmental subdivision or agency. The official comments
explain that "certain governmental borrowings include collateral in
the form of assignments of ... electricity ... charges . . ." which are
governed by "special provisions of law." 110 The term "special provisions of law" primarily refers to the statute establishing the authority
and any references therein to the creation of security interests. While
every organic law must be reviewed individually such statutes typically provide that "any bond resolution may contain provisions, which
shall be part of the contract with bondholders. . . pledging all or any
part of the moneys and revenues derived from the project to secure
payment of the bonds." This clause alone might be sufficient to allow
the creation of an immediately perfected security interest at the time
of first delivery of the bonds or execution and delivery of a trust
indenture. Careful legislative drafting, however, would ensure that
the pledge is immediately effective without an infinite series of perfections each time money is delivered to the trustee by the city."' Thus,
the common law is modified by legislation only to the extent of
determining that the relevant object of delivery is the bond resolution
or trust indenture which incorporates within it the concept of a stream
of revenues.
A second approach is to analyze the statutory language of Section
362 of the Bankruptcy Code, particularly Section 362(b)(3), 112 which
removes from the operation of the stay any act to perfect an interest in
property to the extent that such perfection would be upheld under the
substantive provisions of Section 546(b).113 If perfection of the lien is
110. U.C.C. § 9-104, 3 U.L.A. 35, comment 5 (1981).
111. Typical legislation is illustrated by the following New York statute, N.Y.
PUB. AUTH. LAW § 561 (4-c) (McKinney 1982):
It is the intention hereof that any pledge of tolls or other revenues or
other moneys made by the authority shall be valid and binding from the
time when the pledge is made; that the tolls or other revenues or other
moneys so pledged and thereafter received by the authority shall immediately be subject to the lien of such pledge without any physical delivery
thereof or further act, and that the lien of any such pledge shall be valid
and binding as against all parties having claims of any kind in tort,
contract or otherwise against the authority irrespective of whether such
parties have notice thereof. Neither the resolution nor any other instrument by which a pledge is created need be recorded.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (Supp. 11 1978).

113. Id. § 546(b).
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inevitable, nothing is gained by invoking a stay to temporarily prevent
the perfection. 114 Section 546(b) provides that the right of the municipality to avoid liens under Sections 544,115 545116 and 549117 is subject
to the superior right of a creditor having power under any generally
applicable law to enforce the perfection of a lien against an entity that
acquires pre-petition rights. For example, assume that the Electric
Utility Authority of City X has just lost a lawsuit for damages to a
frozen food warehouse resulting from the negligent failure to supply
electricity. The plaintiff obtains a judicial lien to secure his judgment.
Under the laws of priority of the state, the bondholders' trustee would
probably have a superior lien to assure the availability of revenues to
pay debt service prior to the payment of the award for damages. In
the context of a petition for debt adjustment under Chapter 9, the
authority would have the power to avoid the judicial lien of the
warehouse,11 8 but because the bondholders' trustee has the power to
supersede the judicial lien of the warehouse, nothing would be gained
by a stay to temporarily prevent the bondholder trustee from perfecting its lien. The purpose of Sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b) is to aid
creditors' efforts to enforce their liens under Section 362(a) when their
ultimate success is assured under applicable law. The importance of
this analysis becomes clear when revenue bond issues are involved and
a contrary result could cause the authority to miss an interest payment
date, thereby damaging the secondary market for bonds.
A third approach is to consider the constitutional policy considerations implicit in Section 904."9 Section 904 prohibits the bankruptcy court, without the consent of the municipality, from interfering with the political or government powers of the municipality or
any of its property or "revenues." In response to the Supreme Court's
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 120 the legislative history
to Section 904 makes clear the courts may not interfere with a municipality's choice of essential services. Implicit in this policy is the notion
114. The purpose of a stay is to allow the debtor time to proceed without creditors
competing to gain relative advantage in the ultimate disposition of the property.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340-42 (1977).
115. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 544 (Supp. 11 1978).
116. Id. §§ 901(a), 545.

117. Id. §§ 901(a), 549.
118. Id. § 362(2).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (Supp. I 1978), provides that "notwithstanding any power
of the court . . . the court may not, by any stay . . . interfere with
(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor;
(2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
(3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing property."
120. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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that courts may not set aside contracts which municipalities have
executed in order to provide those services.12 1 If a court lacks the
power to interfere with such a contract, then it cannot stay the
enforcement of the contract with the bondholders.
A fourth approach is to examine the trustee's judicial relief under
Section 362(d) .122 After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy judge
may grant relief from the stay either if the effect of the stay is to deny
the creditor adequate protection of an interest in property123 or if the
debtor does not have an equity in such property. 2 4 The policy of
Chapter 9 is to recognize and give effect to those liens that are not
subject to avoidance. 125 If the stay operates effectively to destroy a
valid lien, then the stay should be lifted with respect to the credi26
tors.1
The effect of the stay as interpreted by Mr. Jones, the Finance
Director, is to free pledged revenues for general use by City X. The

121. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Contract Clause has been straightforward and consistent where municipalities enter into contracts to induce private
sources of capital to invest in the municipality. The confusion in the literature arises
from the ability of states to set aside certain contracts where the police power is
invoked, i.e., concerns for health, safety and welfare. Where there is a danger to the
health or safety of a state's inhabitants the police power extends to the ability to set
aside even contracts of the state itself. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232
U.S. 548 (1914); Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-stock Landing Co. v.
Crescent City Live-stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1883);
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park 97 U.S. 659
(1878). However, where the police power is invoked for the economic benefit of the
public and not its health or safety, the public must live with its contracts. There is no
authority to use the police powers to breach a contract in order to bargain for a better
deal. United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); City of
Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co.. 230 U.S. 58 (1913); Saint Tammany
Water Works v. New Orleans Water Works, 120 U.S. 64 (1887); New Orleans Gas
Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. 11 1978). The legislative history indicates a congressional intent that such hearings receive a priority on the calendar. H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). A motion for relief is not the assertion of a claim
giving opportunity for a counterclaim. In re Essex Properties, Ltd., 430 F. Supp.
1112 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
123. A typical example is the use of a stay to deny a mortgagee the power to
foreclose in an economic environment where the value of the property is declining.
124. If a $10,000 debt is secured by property worth $3,000 there is nothing to be
gained for the debtor by preventing foreclosure.
125. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 506 (Supp. 111978). See also Straton v. New, Trustee in
Bankruptcy, 283 U.S. 318 (1930), for a general discussion of recognition of valid
claims generally.
126. See Kennedy, Automatic Stays under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 3 (1978); Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 177 (1978); Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979).
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diversion of revenues is perhaps the clearest example of a creditor
being denied adequate protection where those revenues are the creditor's collateral. Likewise, if the bond resolution controls the flow of
funds of the revenues for specified purposes, City X has no equity in
the revenues.1 27 The counter argument of the Finance Director is
that until the revenues are delivered to the trustee, the trustee has no
security interest in the revenues under the common law requirement
that a pledge must be delivered to be effective. 28 The Finance
Director further argues that Section 552(a) 29 allows the municipality
to avoid the claim of the bond trustee; therefore, the claim is not one
entitled to be given effect under Section 506. Section 552(a) provides
that property acquired by the debtor after the commencement of the
action is not subject to any lien resulting from a security agreement
entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the action.
Section 552(a) was drafted in response to a UCC provision which
permits a security agreement allowing a creditor a lien on afteracquired property. 130 The policy of the Bankruptcy Code is to limit
the effect of "floating liens" by making them inoperative to postpetition property of the debtor. For example, the lender who has a
floating lien on inventory may not assert a lien in any inventory
purchased by the debtor after the petition is filed.
The argument of the Finance Director is still incomplete. Section
552(b)' 3' provides that if a security agreement entered into before the
32
commencement of the case creates a security interest in proceeds,
then such security interest extends to proceeds acquired by the debtor
after commencement of the action. Assuming the bond resolution or
trust indenture does not create a mortgage in the physical property
constructed with the bond proceeds, the property in which a security
interest attaches prior to the commencement of the action is the
system of accounts established by the bond resolution or trust indenture. The revenues received by City X are proceeds of the accounts

127. If the flow of funds allows a payment of excesses to the city after operating
expenses, debt service and reserves are funded, the best way to protect the city's
equity is to flow the funds in accordance with the resolution and make the payment
to the city free and clear of the resolution as provided therein.
128. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
129. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 552(a) (Supp. 11 1978).

130. U.C.C. § 9-204.
131. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
132. Section 552(b) refers to "proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits of such
property" acquired before the commencement of the case. For example, a real estate
mortgage could be secured by the first rents received in any month up to the amount
of the monthly mortgage payment. The rents would, upon receipt, not be subject to
the avoidance powers under § 552(a).
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receivable which may not be diverted by the city if the revenues are
subject to the pledge upon receipt by the city. 133 The security interest

of the trustee is valid upon receipt of the proceeds of revenue by the
city. The bond resolution or trust indenture makes the city an agent of
the trustee to collect the fees and charges and Section 552 does not
134
empower the city to avoid the trustee's liens.
Each of the illustrations considered thus far has involved revenue
bonds either of an authority or a city. Transmission and distribution
of electricity also could be financed by the issuance of general obligation bonds of a city payable not from a pledge of revenues but from
the taxing powers of the city. For purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, a
general obligation bond is a form of unsecured debt, 135 and much of
the analysis of the relief provisions from the automatic stay applicable
to secured creditors, including the revenue bondholder, would not
apply to general obligation bondholders. This difficulty is compounded by the absence of a trustee to take immediate action because
general obligation bonds typically are not issued with the appointment of a trustee. The security for the general obligation bondholder
is the "full faith and credit" of the municipality under the state
136
If
constitutional provision which gives substance to that phrase.

133. As discussed above, the law of the state would probably subject the revenues
to the pledge immediately even if the state has taken government transfers out of
Article 9 of the U.C.C. and the analysis of "proceeds" made in Article 9.
134. While the present Bankruptcy Code protects the pledge of revenues, there
has been sufficient concern raised with respect to this issue for it to be addressed in
the technical amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979), now pending before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. The proposed amendment would add a new § 928(c) as follows:
(c) If the debtor and a secured party enter into a security agreement
before the commencement of the case and the obligation of the debtor is
secured by a security interest in and is payable solely from specifically
identified revenues including tax revenues, proceeds, rents, profits, or
other similar moneys of the debtor, then such security interest shall extend
to such revenues including specified tax revenues, proceeds, rents, profits,
or other similar moneys acquired by the state after the commencement of
the case to the extent provided by such security agreement and by applicable bankruptcy law.
135. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1978).
136. For the constitutional framework providing security to the holders of general
obligation bonds in New York, see Wein v. Levitt, 42 N.Y.2d 300, 366 N.E.2d 847,
397 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1977); Quirk v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 644, 363
N.E.2d 549, 394 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1977); Wein v. Carey, 41 N.Y.2d 498, 362 N.E.2d
587, 393 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1977); Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40
N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976); Wein v. State, 39 N.Y.2d 136,
347 N.E.2d 586, 383 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1976); Sgaglione v. Levitt, 37 N.Y.2d 507, 337
N.E.2d 592, 375 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975); Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d 610, 331
N.E.2d 514, 370 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1975); Comereski v. City of Elmira, 308 N.Y. 248,
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the constitutional scheme gives priority to payment of employee expenses over debt service and such expenses are the cause of insolvency,
then there may well be circumstances under which a revenue bond is
a more secure obligation than a general obligation bond of the same
issuer.
D. Payment of Debt Service as a Voidable Preference
One of the purposes of Chapter 9 is to allow the insolvent municipality to formulate a plan for the orderly adjustment of debts. The
automatic stay is not intended to have substantive consequences but is
meant to provide extra time while the plan is being formulated,
although in the context of revenue bonds, the automatic stay has
significant substantive consequences and is likely to trigger litigation
by the bond trustee. A plan of adjustment under the Bankruptcy Code
is conducted much like a business reorganization. Accordingly, the
Chapter 11 reorganization provisions are incorporated into Chapter
9,137 except for those sections which imply the existence of a trustee
administering a hypothetical estate. To facilitate the operation of the
reorganization sections, Chapter 9 incorporates the early sections of
Chapter 5 relating to the allowance and priorities of claims. Chapter 9
also incorporates certain of the later sections of Chapter 5 relating to
the avoidance of claims as well as appropriate sections of Chapter 3
relating to case administration.
Unless the bond trustee successfully opposes the termination of the
bondholders' liens in after-acquired revenues by operation of Section
552, the application of the preference avoidance powers of the municipality under Section 547138 could result in a revenue bond becoming
an unsecured debt as of ninety days prior to the filing of the petition.
A preference is defined in Section 547 as any transfer of the municipality's property to or for the benefit of a creditor, for or on account of an
antecedent debt of the municipality, made while the municipality is
insolvent and within ninety days before the filing of the petition. Such
a transfer allows the transferee to receive more than it would receive
in a liquidation action if the transfer had not been made. 39 The
theory of the preference section is to provide equality of treatment
among creditiors, thereby avoiding transfers made shortly before
bankruptcy which gives one creditor unfair advantage over others.
125 N.E.2d 241 (1955); Union Free School Dist. No. 3 v. Town of Rye, 280 N.Y. 469,
21 N.E.2d 681 (1939).
137. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (Supp. H 1978).
138. Id. § 547(b).
139. Id.
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Assume the Electric Utility Bonds have a principal and interest
payment date on June 1 and ninety days later the issuer files a Chapter
9 petition. Would Section 547 operate to annul the payments by the
trustee to the bondholders on June 1 or merely the transfers of revenues to the trustee after June 1? If the June 1 payment of debt service
is voided, the effect is to treat both the payments of revenues for the
accumulation of principal during the prior year and the accumulation
of interest since February 1 as preferential.140 A supposed ninety day
problem is suddenly a 450 day problem.' 4 ' The answer depends on
the language of the bond resolution or trust indenture. Section 547
refers to "any transfer of property of the debtor."142 If the transfers
prior to June 1 are held by the trustee in trust for the bondholders, the
revenues are property of the trustee and not the debtor.143 A different
outcome could result if the issuer accumulated the revenues in its own
commercial banking accounts and transferred required debt service
on June 1.
There are several arguments for the non-application of the preference section to revenue bonds. First, there is no preference unless the
transfer enables the creditor to receive more than the creditor would
receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation in which no transfers were made.
For Chapter 9 municipal debt adjustments, there is no possibility of
liquidation and no incorporation of any sections of Chapter 7. The
reference to Chapter 7 in Section 547, therefore, is meaningless in a
Chapter 9 case, although the reference is central to the concept of a
preference. If Chapter 7 did operate, the liquidation analysis would
first necessitate determining the allowability of the claim under Section 502144 and its priority under Section 507.145 Since these sections
are incorporated into Chapter 9 the analysis could proceed, without
disservice to Section 547, to a determination whether in the reorganization provisions applicable to Chapter 9 the transfer results in an
overpayment. If the plan of adjustment under the reorganization
sections would necessitate protection of the revenue bondholders, then

140. This assumes a typical revenue bond resolution under which revenues are
accumulated for principal during the course of the year between principal payment
dates (which are at yearly intervals) and revenues are accumulated for interest during
the six months between interest payment dates (which are at semi-annual intervals).
141. It also would disadvantage the holders of registered bonds, who can be
traced, relative to the holders of bearer bonds, who cannot be traced.
142. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 547(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
143. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (2d ed. 1965).

144. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 502 (Supp. 11 1978).
145. Id. §§ 901(a), 507.

1982]

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

Section 547 should not apply to transfers of revenues from the city to
the bond trustee during the ninety day period.
Second, the preference section serves to prevent the extraordinary
payment or transfer which unfairly benefits a creditor. Section 547
was never intended, however, to interrupt the ordinary course of
business affairs. Under Section 547(c)(2),146 there is no voidable payment if (i) a debt is incurred in the ordinary course of business affairs,
(ii) payment is made not later than forty-five days after the debt is
incurred, (iii) payment is made in the ordinary course of business
affairs of the debtor and transferee, and (iv) payment is made according to ordinary business terms. The difficult issue is the meaning of the
requirement that payment be made not later than forty-five days after
the debt is incurred. 147 The reference to "debt" in the requirement
that revenues be transferred to the trustee upon receipt by the city
could only refer to the obligation of the city to make payment to the
trustee within forty-five days of receipt by the city of the fees paid by
consumers of electricity. The word "debt" should not mean the original issuance of bonds because there is no obligation to pay revenues to
the trustee at that time. Debt can only mean the time at which the
city is obligated to make a transfer of revenues to the trustee. On that
date a debt is incurred, 48 and if payment is made within forty-five
days, the statute should be satisfied.
Third, Section 547(e)149 provides that a transfer is not made until
the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred. This provision makes it difficult to argue that the transfer has taken place at the
time the bonds are issued, as opposed to the time of billing or receipt

146. Id. § 547(c)(2).
147. In the typical case, a seller delivers goods to a buyer, and if the payment
obligation is within 45 days of delivery, normal trade practices are being followed
and the preference rules do not apply. In the case of Weill v. Southern Credit Union
(In re Bowen), 3 Bankr. 617 (E.D. Tenn. 1980), the court held that § 547(c)(2) was
intended to protect a special class of contemporaneous exchanges and had no application to loan repayments. Id. at 619. See also Belfance v. Bancohiol Nat'l Bank (In re
McCormick), 5 Bankr. 726 (N.D. Ohio 1980), holding that "'45 days after such debt
was incurred"' refers only to the date on which the debtor originally assumed legal
obligation to pay and debt is not considered to be incurred every month when an
installment comes due. Id. at 730-31. Unlike the seller-buyer situations where the
seller must perform by delivering the goods to the buyer, in a loan transaction, such
as a bond issue, the lender has fully performed on the date the loan is made.
148. The counter-argument to Bowen and McCormick is that under § 547 (a)(4), a
debt is incurred when due. For the argument that "incurred" means "due" in
§ 547(c)(2), see Tait and Williams, Bankruptcy Preference Laws: The Scope of
Section 547(c)(2), 99 BANKING L.J. 55, 59 (1982).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. 11 1978).
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of revenues by the city from customers. 150 Depending upon the drafting of rate ordinances and the statutory framework authorizing the
municipal imposition of fees and charges, the city may have acquired
rights to revenues at a much earlier date than the date of payment to
the trustee. If the city's rights have been assigned to the bond trustee,
the transfer may be complete at an earlier date for purposes of tolling
the ninety days prior to the petition.151 The statute creating the
authority or the rights of the city to collect rates and charges also
should be carefully considered to determine whether there is a statutory lien. 5 2 A statutory lien would be protected from the application
of the preference provisions 5 3 unless it came into effect with the filing
of the petition, 154 an unlikely event with respect to a statutory lien for
rates and charges.
Fourth, as stated above, Section 547(e) was specifically drafted to
make certain floating liens subject to the preference rules. If a creditor
with an outstanding loan of $50,000 has a floating lien on the equipment of the debtor worth $10,000 ninety days prior to the petition,
but worth $30,000 on the date of the petition because the debtor has
acquired new equipment, the creditor would have a preference of
$20,000, representing the amount by which the unsecured portion of
the loan has been reduced. Section 547(c) (5)155 creates an exception for
perfected floating liens in inventory or accounts receivable and their
proceeds. The bond trustee has accounts receivable with the authority
or the city (which in turn has accounts with customers) and the
revenues derived from payments by customers are proceeds. Section
547(c)(5), therefore, may be a valuable means of avoiding the preference rules. 5 To take advantage of Section 547(c)(5), it is necessary
to compare the value of the collateral ninety days prior to the petition
150. The purpose of § 547(e)(3) is to overrule DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277
(9th Cir. 1969), and Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank & Sav. Co.,
408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. France v. Union Bank & Sav. Co.,
396 U.S. 827 (1969), which had protected floating liens against preference attack.
151. The effect of this may be to subject payments to the bond trustees after the
petition is filed to preference attack on the theory that the transfer took place before
the petition.
152. 11 U.S.C. § 101(38) (Supp. 11 1978), defines a statutory lien as a lien arising
solely by force of a statute or specified circumstances or conditions. It is because
many revenue bond statutes provide statutory liens on the revenues providing the
security for the bonds that the 1972 version of the U.C.C. removed government
transfers from Article 9.
153. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) (Supp. 11 1978).
154. Id. §§ 901(a), 545(2).

155. Id. § 547(c)(5).
156. Compare § 547(c)(5) with § 552(b); see notes 131-32 supra and accompanying text.
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with the value on the date of filing the petition to make certain that
unsecured creditors are not prejudiced. If the value of the collateral
increases because of new acquisitions during the ninety day period, as
in the case above, there is a preference. Similarly, if the authority or
the city expends moneys to provide electricity to more customers,
thereby gaining new accounts as collateral, there is a preference. If
the value of the collateral increases without new purchases, however,
there is no prejudice to the unsecured creditors and no preference.
Fluctuations in value of the bond trustee's accounts and the accounts
with customers are of the latter type. Their value rises and falls
according to variations in the payment cycle. Section 547(c)(5), therefore, should insulate most revenue bond situations from the applica15 7
tion of the preference rules.
E. Standby Letter of Credit Payments as Preferences
With high interest rates during the past two years, an increasing
number of standby letters of credit have been used in public finance to
improve security and obtain more favorable interest rates.158 A letter
of credit is a commitment undertaken by a commercial bank (issuer)
issued pursuant to instructions from the applicant (customer) in favor
of a third party (beneficiary).15 9 In public finance, the customer is
likely to be the political subdivision and the beneficiary the bond
trustee. The standby letter of credit differs from a conventional commercial letter of credit which contemplates payment by the issuer to
the beneficiary upon the beneficiary's performance of the acts specified in the customer's instructions. The standby letter of credit conditions payment to the beneficiary on the occurrence of some event of
default by the customer, thereby functioning much like a guarantee.
The standby letter of credit creates an independent obligation between the issuer and the beneficiary apart from the underlying transaction between the beneficiary and the customer. This independent
quality of the letter of credit has allowed the courts to distinguish
between letters of credit and guarantees which few national and state
60
banks have the power to issue. 1
157. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 374-77 (1977).
158. For general discussions of the increasing use of letters of credit for domestic
use, see Harfield, The IncreasingDomestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.L.J.
251 (1972); Joseph, Letters of Credit: The Developing Concepts and Financing
Functions, 94 BANKINc L.J. 816 (1977).
159. U.C.C. § 5-103(l).
160. Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73 (5th Cir. 1922). See
generally Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the Standby Letter of Credit Controversy, 96 BANKING L.J. 46 (1979). The Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. X

The Bankruptcy Code contemplates that payment on a standby
letter of credit is likely to occur near the time that a petition by the
bank customer is filed. There is an apparent preference to the beneficiaries of the letters of credit if a step transaction analysis is applied.
For example, the authority issues its Utility Revenue Bonds on January 1, 1983. To improve the marketability of its bonds, which would
be poorly rated, the authority obtains from a commercial bank a
standby letter of credit in an amount equal to the outstanding principal amount of bonds plus one year's interest. The letter of credit
provides that the bond trustee, as beneficiary, is authorized to draw
down on the letter of credit any shortfalls in revenues on any principal
or interest payment date relative to debt service as certified by the
bond trustee. On January 1, 1986, the authority is unable to meet debt
service, and the bond trustee calls upon the letter of credit. The bond
resolution provides for an immediate redemption of bonds in an
amount equal to the principal outstanding and interest accrued to the
redemption date. Typically, the redemption date is the following
interest payment date, or July 1, 1986 in this instance. Because the
amount of the standby letter of credit is equal to the amount necessary
to redeem all outstanding bonds if necessary, the authority's bonds are
fully secured and the bank rating will be substituted for the authority's rating. Furthermore, the lower interest rates usually obtained
more than compensate for the fees associated with the letter of credit.
The bondholders are fully paid on July 1, 1986. On August 1, 1986,
the authority files a Chapter 9 petition.
Any doubt that this transaction will be sustained under the Bankruptcy Code creates a serious disclosure problem under the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act. If it may be necessary to file a petition under the
Bankruptcy Code, and if the letter of credit would then be ineffective,
the lack of protection should be disclosed and the rating should not be
that of the bank. Applying a two step analysis to the transaction, it
becomes apparent that to the extent the bondholders are not paid
from revenues (the security for the bonds), the bondholders are unsecured creditors. 16' By receiving payment during the ninety day period prior to the filing of the petition, the second step is to conclude
that there is a preference given to these unsecured creditors relative to

Reserve Board and the FDIC have each issued regulations to distinguish standby
letters of credit from unlawful guarantees: 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160 (1980); 12 C.F.R. §
208.8(d)(1) (1980); and 12 C.F.R. § 337.2(a)(1980).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. 11 1978), provides that to the extent the value of
the collateral is less than the total allowed claim, the creditor is deemed to have an
unsecured claim.

1982]

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

other unsecured creditors. Alternatively, the effect of the payment
under the letter of credit is to substitute for the unsecured bondholders
a secured commercial bank. The bank is secure to the extent it has a
right of set-off,16 2 but the set-off occurs during the preference period
6 4
in violation of Section 547163 or Section 553(a)(2)(B).
The weakness of the two step analysis is that the bondholder is not
unsecured to the extent of the revenue shortfall, but is fully secured by
reason of the letter of credit.16 5 Therefore, the bondholder is protected by Section 547(c)(5). 6 6 Furthermore, there is no transfer "of
property of the debtor," the very essence of a preference.1 67 To apply
the Bankruptcy Code, it is important to remember that the letter of
credit creates an independent relationship between the bank issuer
and the beneficiary. Payment by the bank issuer to the beneficiary is
not a transfer of the customer's property. The issue was discussed in
the context of a case concerning a standby letter of credit. In In
Matter of Marine Distributors,Inc.,' 6 8 the Ninth Circuit held that the
bankrupt had no property interest in either the moneys distributed by
the bank to the beneficiaries or the documents held by the beneficiaries necessary to effect payment. The letters of credit represented an
obligation of the bank independent of the bankruptcy proceedings and
the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction with respect to the
69
letter of credit.1

162. If the bank issuing the letter of credit is a depository of the customer there is a
right to set-off the bank account against the debt arising upon the occurrence of
payment under the letter of credit. New York County Nat'l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S.
138 (1904). 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. 11 1978), provides that an allowed claim that
has an interest on property subject to set-off is a secured claim.
163. The argument is that the creation of the security interest in the set-off is a
"transfer" of an interest in property under the definition of "transfer" in 11 U.S.C. §
101(40), even though a set-off itself is not a transfer. 124 CoNG. REc. H.11,090 (Sept.
28, 1978); S17,407 (Oct. 6, 1078).
164. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 553(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 111978), provides that the right of a
creditor (the bank) to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor (the
political subdivision's bank account) will not be permitted if the claim was transferred by an entity other than the debtor to such creditor during the 90 day period prior
to the filing of the petition.
165. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (Supp. 111978), defines "security interest" to mean a lien
created by an agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 101(28) (Supp. 11 1978), defines a lien to be a
charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of
an obligation. The letter of credit creates a lien in the beneficiary against the issuer
bank by reason of the agreement of the issuer and its customer. There is a charge
against the bank by reason of bank regulations. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160 (1979).
166. See notes 155-56 supra and accompanying text.
167. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
168. 522 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1975).
169. Id. at 795.
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The right of the beneficiary to receive payment on a letter of credit
should not be affected by any bank accounts of the debtor to which
the bank might attempt to apply a set-off. The right of the bank to set1 70
off has no bearing on the right of the beneficiary to payment.
Under Section 553(a)(2), no set-off is allowed when the claim to be
set-off against the bank account has been transferred to the bank
during the preference period.'71 Set-offs have been permitted, however, where the claimant was compelled to acquire the claim through
contractual obligation.172 The right of set-off should be of concern to
banks in the standby letter of credit context, 173 but should not impair
the rights of beneficiaries using a letter of credit from a third party as
74
an independent source of security.1
F. Executory Contracts
Section 554 75 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee in bankruptcy to abandon property of the estate that is "burdensome."'' 7
municipal..
Section 554 is ngq! incorporated into Chapter 91 77.because
7
property is held in trust for the public and cannot be abandoned.1
170. Id. at 794-95.
171. The purpose of § 553(a)(2) is to prevent the bank from purposefully acquiring
claims prior to the petition in order to take advantage of prepetition set-off avoiding
the stay of set-off upon the filing of the petition under § 362(a)(7) and the right of the
trustee in bankruptcy to the use of cash collateral under § 363.
172. Hayden v. Standard, Accident Ins. Co., 316 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1963); Lowenthal v. Block, 175 Misc. 472, 22 N.Y.S.2d 736 (N.Y. City Ct. 1940).
173. See Note, An Analysis of the Setoff Provision of the Bankruptcy Code as it
Affects the Banking Industry, 1980 ANN. SUR. OF BANKR. L., 459, 462.
174. The issue has been thoroughly confused by the inexplicable reasoning of
Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Bank (In re Twist Cap, Inc.), 1 Bankr. 284 (1979).
Without any consideration of the independent nature of the letter of credit, the court
distinguished Marine Distributions, Inc. where property had been placed with the
bank as security for any payments on letters of credit and reasoned that payment to
the beneficiary would be payment from the debtor's property which gave the court
jurisdiction to enjoin payment by the bank. Id. at 285. The Twist Cap approach
recently has been rejected in favor of the position taken in this Article: In re Page,
D.C., 18 Bankr. 713 (Mar. 30, 1982), holding that the cashing of the letter of credit
had no bearing on the property of the debtor under § 362, regardless of the security
held by the bank, since the letter of credit is an independent contractual obligation.
The analysis of the bank's security under the Bankruptcy Code is a separate inquiry.
175. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. 11 1978).
176. In the typical nonmunicipal bankruptcy case, the Bankruptcy Code severs
the debtor from most of the property acquired by the debtor prior to the filing of the
petition, requires that most prepetition rights and interests be satisfied from this
hypothetical "property of the estate" and grants the debtor a discharge from many
obligations incurred prior to the petition. In municipal debt adjustments under
Chapter 9 there is no hypothetical "property of the estate," but the importance of the
date of filing the petition is retained for the analysis of many rights and interests.
177. Section 554 is not cross-referenced in § 901(a).
178. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 397 (1977).
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Chapter 9 does, however, incorporate a very similar provision, Section 365,179 which allows the debtor to assume or reject executory
contracts which are burdensome' 80 to the reorganization efforts of the
debtor municipality.
While the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "executory
contract," the legislative history and comments 181 utilize the
"Countryman definition" 182 that an executory contract is one in which
both parties have not performed to the extent that failure by either to
complete performance would constitute a material breach.18 3 A revenue bond is not an executory contract because the bondholder has
184
fully performed when he pays for the bonds upon their delivery.
If the Electric Utility Board has entered into a contract to purchase
1000 yards of no. 3 wire which the supplier has delivered prior to the
petition, there is no executory contract to assume or reject. The same
result occurs if the wire has been paid for but has not yet been
delivered. If neither has performed by delivery or payment, there is
an executory contract, and the decision of the debtor to assume or
reject usually will be a simple matter of comparing the market price of
the wire at the time of contract with the price at the time a decision is
being made to reject or accept. If the debtor rejects, the supplier has
an allowable claim 85 for the difference in market price, 18 but he will
receive no preferential treatment if his claim is not secured or entitled
to priority under Section 507.187 The decision to assume or reject
becomes more difficult if the current market price is higher so that
assumption would be profitable, but the debtor determines the repair
work would be burdensome because the expenses incurred in connection with the repairs would not be in the best interests of rehabilitating the debtor. The problem is complicated if the repair work is
necessary to preserve the revenue-producing capability of a portion of
the system providing revenues securing bonds. The test for determining a burdensome contract is the "business judgment text,' 1 88 and its
179. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 365 (Supp. 11 1978).
180. The common law power of a trustee in bankruptcy to reject executory
contracts grew out of the common law power to abandon burdensome property. See
Note, Abandonment of Assets by a Trustee, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 415, 416 (1953).
181. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, pt. II, at 155, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
182. Countryman, Executory Contractsin Bankruptcy: Part I,57 MINN. L. REV.

439 (1972-73).
183. Id. at 460.
184. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977).
185. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (Supp. I 1978).
186. Id. § 365(g).
187. Id. § 507.
188. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul Pacific
R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 550-51 (1943).
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application requires that the debtor look at all the consequences of
rejection including the impact on creditors. 8 9
From the perspective of the securities lawyer concerned with disclosure, the right to assume or reject executory contracts is of concern not
only with respect to the issuer, but also as to entities with whom the
issuer is entering into agreements. If a major contractor or supplier of
the issuer is financially weak, and the application of Section 365 by
such person's trustee in bankruptcy would materially affect the security of the bonds, there may be a disclosure problem. There is no
obligation, however, to use due diligence to determine the financial
strength of all contracting parties with the issuer. For example, a bond
issue for the financing of apartment buildings usually involves agreements with many developers, depending on the number of developments being financed. The relevant disclosure is the underwriting
standards applied by the issuer in selecting developers and managing
projects. The primary concern of the investor is in the capability of the
issuer to exercise care in its business affairs. 190
G. Preparation of the Plan of Adjustment
A Chapter 9 debt adjustment and a Chapter 11 reorganization are
essentially contracts between the debtor and its creditors,' 9 ' and both
chapters encourage contractual negotiations prior to the filing of a
petition.19 2 While much of Chapter 9 is based on the incorporation
by reference of Chapter 11, there are differences resulting from the
state's power to oversee its political subdivisions and the inapplicability of reorganization of ownership and management in the Chapter 9
context.
189. Id.
190. Since this would be an industrial development bond, the Bankruptcy Code is
applied if a developer is in Chapter 7, 11 or 13 proceedings. The municipality or its
bond trustee is in the position of a claimant and, therefore, further relevant disclosure is the nature of the security with the developer.
191. Chapter 9 is not entitled "municipal reorganizations" although many of its
operative provisions are derived by cross-references to Chapter 11. The theory of
Chapter 9 is that management of the municipality's operations will remain unchanged while Chapter 11 has the possibility of extensive changes in the ownership
and management of the business organization, i.e., reorganization. In practice, there
may be significant changes in management under Chapter 9. The work-out agreement with creditors may, by contract, require changes in the conduct of the financial
affairs of the municipality. 11 U.S.C. § 926 (Supp. II 1978), provides for the
appointment of a trustee if the debtor itself is refusing to enforce its avoidance
powers. Nonbankruptcy law may require that there be a receiver appointed.
192. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 1126(b) (Supp. 11 1978). Section 941 also contemplates
the possible filing of a plan at the time of the petition. A primary purpose of the
Chapter 9 amendments in 1976 was to bring an end to the requirement that a plan be
approved by 51% in amount of the creditors prior to the filing of a petition. H.R.
REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 544 (1976).
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For example, to retain state control, Chapter 9 allows only the
debtor to file a plan. 93 The Chapter 11 provisions19 4 permitting
other parties in interest, including indenture trustees, to file a plan are
not incorporated into Chapter 9.195 There are also distinctions for the
management of operating expenses to maintain the entity as a going
concern. Chapter 9 assumes that the application of the stay to the
payment of debt service on general obligation bonds will automatically provide sufficient relief to enable the municipality to pay for
essential services.196 Chapter 11, in contrast, assumes that the debtor
will need access to collateral securing the debt in order for the corporation to pay operating expenses. Thus, provision is made for the
debtor to use both cash 19 7 and non-cash' 98 collateral to maintain the
viability of the corporation.
Upon the filing of a petition, the debtor is required to submit a list
of creditors' 99 who have claims200 against the debtor. If a creditor or
indenture trustee does not appear on the list, a proof of claim may be
filed. 20 1 When the list of claims is complete, negotiation and voting
on a plan is based upon the classification of claims. 20 2 Under Section
1122, claims may be included in the same class only if the claims are
193. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (Supp. 11 1978).
194. Id. § 1121.
195. Id. §§ 901(a), 903, 904.
196. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 566 (1976): "With the petitioner
relieved of the burden of debt service by the filing of the petition, in most cases the
petitioner will be able to pay all operating expenses currently, or under credit terms
which obtained prior to the filing of the petition."
197. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(Supp. 11 1978). Cash collateral, including cash, bank
accounts, negotiable instruments and securities may not be used by the debtor unless
the secured party consents or there is a court order finding adequate protection under

§ 361. Id.
198. Id. § 363(c)(1). Inventory, accounts receivable and other non-cash collateral
may be used to operate the business without notice of a court order.
199. Id. § 924.
200. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (Supp. 11 1978), defines "claim" as follows:
"claim" means(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an
equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured; ...
201. Id. §§ 901, 925.
202. Id. §§ 901(a), 1122:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a plan may
place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claim or
interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such class.
(b) A plan may designate a separate class of claims consisting only of
every unsecured claim that is less than or reduced to an amount that the
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substantially similar.20 3 While Section 1122 distinguishes "claims" 20 4
and "interests, ' 205 there is little or no likelihood that there will be an
20 6
interest in a municipality.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, unsecured claims must be classed
separately from administrative expenses. 20 7 General obligation bonds
also should be placed in a separate class because they are entitled to
unique constitutional and statutory protection, 208 and general obligation bondholders are entitled to enforce full faith and credit provisions
20
by proceedings in mandamus.
Secured claims will be placed in separate classes if they involve
different property or are of different kinds or ranks. 210 Bondholders
with a first mortgage on the same property may be placed in the same
class if they are entitled to parity of treatment under the trust indenture, even if the bonds contain varying maturities or are issued in one
or more series. 211 If the property which provides the security is not
21 2
the same, separate classes must be created.

court approves as reasonable and necessary for administrative convenience.
203. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 406 (1977).
204. See note 192 supra.
205. The term "interest" is not defined but is used to describe proprietary rights
which (in the sense of ownership interests) are unlikely in municipal law. The
distinction is confused, however, by the definition of a secured claim as one in which
there is an interest in property, 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. I 1978).
206. Chapter 9 contemplates this result by requiring a list of "creditors" which is
defined as those who have "claims," not "interests," 11 U.S.C. §§ 924, 101(9) (Supp.
111978), but since a secured claim is one in which there is an interest in property, the
term "interest" is used in two contexts under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §
506(a) (Supp. 111978). While Chapter 9 does not contemplate ownership interests in
the municipality, it does contemplate interests in property of the municipality as
security.
207. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a)(1), 1123 (Supp. 111978). In business reorganizations, the
§ 507 categories of expenses for purposes of priority in payment of operating expenses
must be separately classified. Chapter 9 does not have a similar requirement. Chapter 9 does not have a similar requirement.
208. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Spink, 145 Cal. App. 2d 568, 303 P.2d 46
(Dist. Ct. App. 1956); State v. City of Lakeland, 154 Fla. 137, 16 So. 2d 924 (1943);
State v. Citrus County, 116 Fla. 676, 157 So. 4 (1934).
209. See, e.g., Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472 (1880); County of Sacramento
v. Hickman, 66 Cal. 2d 841, 428 P.2d 593, 59 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1967) (en banc); Delta
County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. Leonard, 516 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1974),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829 (1975).
210. Scherk v. Newton, 152 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1945).
211. Jordan v. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1940), cert.

denied, 312 U.S. 693 (1941).
212. Mokava Corp. v. Dolan, 147 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1945); Kyser v. MacAdam,
117 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1941).

1982]

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

The Bankruptcy Code defines broad categories of clearly distinguishable classes of secured claims. A secured claim is one in which
there is a lien on property. 21 3 Liens21 4 are subdivided into judicial
liens,215 statutory liens, 216 and liens created by agreement. 21 7 Each
type of lien provides a basis for a class and classes are further separated to the extent the liens are on different properties. 218
If separate trust indentures pledge separate sources of revenues,
there will be separate classes for each lien created by agreement
having a different source of security. For example, on January 1,
1983, the Electric Utility Authority of City X issues revenue bonds
secured by rates and charges collected in established industrial, commercial and residential areas of the city. On January 1, 1984, the
Electric Utility Authority of City X issues revenue bonds under a
separate trust indenture secured by rates and charges in lightly developed areas of the city where future growth is expected. When the
Authority files a petition under Chapter 9 on January 1, 1985, it
219
cannot place the two bond issues in the same class.
The plan typically involves negotiations with committees of creditors220 which may be formed to represent each of the major classes of
creditors, or the classes might be represented by an indenture trustee

213. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
214. 11 U.S.C. § 101(28) (Supp. 11 1978), defines lien as a "[c]harge against or
interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation;
215. 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (Supp. 111978), defines judicial lien as a lien "[o]btained
by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding;
216. 11 U.S.C. § 101(38) (Supp. 11 1978), defines statutory lien as a lien:
[a]rising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions or lien of distress for rent, whether or not statutory, but does not
include security interest or judicial lien, whether or not such interest or
lien is provided by or is dependent on a statute and whether or not such
interest or lien is made fully effective by statute; ...
217. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (Supp. II 1978), defines security interest as a lien
"[c]reated by an agreement;.
218. See note 203 supra.
219. See generally Evergreen Farms Co. v. Willacy County Water Control &
Improvement Dist. No. 1, 124 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 687
(1942); Vallette v. Vero Beach, 104 F.2d 59, 62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 586
(1939).
220. 11 U.S.C. § 923 (Supp. II 1978), requires three notices to creditors: the
commencement of the case; the order for relief; or the dismissal of a case. With the
difficulty of identifying creditors based on a capitalization largely dominated by
bearer bonds, notice is by publication in a newspaper in the district and newspaper
in general circulation among bond dealers. Id.
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or similar representative. Labor unions are likely to use their own
22
labor organizations for purposes of negotiations. '
When the plan is formulated it must identify each class and disclose
the method by which that class is to be satisfied. 222 The first step is to
identify the classes that are not "impaired" under the plan. 22 3 Determinations of impairment are of critical importance because a class
that is not impaired will not be entitled to vote on the plan. 22 4 A class
of claims is not impaired if the plan (i) leaves unaltered the legal,
equitable and contractual rights to which such claim entitles the
holder of the claim, (ii) cures defaults that led to the acceleration of
the debt and does not otherwise alter the legal, equitable or contractual rights of the claim, or (iii) provides that on the effective date of
the plan the holder of the claim receives cash equal to the allowed
225
amount of the claim.
Returning to the hypothetical, let us assume that the reason the
Electric Utility Authority of City X has filed a Chapter 9 petition is
that the projected development of the outlying areas of the city did
not take place and there were insufficient revenues to pay debt service
on the bonds issued in 1984. The plan filed by the Authority reduces
the coverage of debt service on the bonds issued in 1983 by changing
the rate covenant from 125 % of debt service to 105 %. The balance of
20 % will be diverted to the funds under the 1984 trust indenture. The
theory of the plan is that the 1983 bondholders are unimpaired because they are still receiving revenues 5 % in excess of the amount
necessary to pay debt service. An impairment clearly exists, however,
because the rate covenant has been reduced exposing the 1983 bondholders to a greater risk than when they purchased bonds at a stated
interest rate. In addition to the increased risk, the 1983 bondholders
are losing the benefits of the 20 % coverage set forth in the trust
indenture for such purposes as the maintenance of the system or the
redemption of bonds.
This plan, however, is not necessarily an improper one. A plan may
alter the rights of any creditors whether secured or unsecured. 2
What is required is that the 1983 bonds be designated as an impaired

221. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 1102 (Supp. II 1978), requires that the unsecured
creditors be represented by a committee ordinarily consisting of the persons holding
the seven largest claims.
222. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a), 1123(a) (Supp. H 1978).
223. Id. § 1123(a)(2).
224. Id. §§ 901(a), 1126(f).
225. Id. §§ 901(a), 1124.
226. Id. § 1123(b).
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class227 and that the plan adequately disclose the effect of the altera228
tion on the security for the 1983 bonds.
The impairment provision focuses attention on the amount of the
claim. The amount of a claim that may be allowed will be determined
as of the date the municipality files its petition. 22 Outstanding principal is allowed but unmatured interest is not. 230 Therefore, if the
class of revenue bondholders is paid the full amount of principal
outstanding together with interest accrued to the date of filing, the
class is not impaired. 231 If the plan does not provide for payment in
full but leaves the principal outstanding, the ability of the 1983 bondholders to claim unmatured interest depends on the value of the
collateral, 232 which in turn depends on the perfection of the lien in
after-acquired proceeds.2 33 If it is determined that the lien is perfected in the future revenues, 234 then the 1983 bondholders will have a
secured claim for interest.2 35 Post-petition interest is an allowable
2 36
claim under Section 506 to the extent of the value of the collateral.
The allowability of post-petition interest under Section 506 requires
a different analysis for a municipality's general obligation bonds if the
bonds share the characteristics of general unsecured debt. An unsecured claim is not entitled to post-petition interest. 237 The typical
general obligation bond, however, "secured by" full faith and credit
has the benefit of constitutional and statutory mandates which require
that the municipality exercise its taxing power to the fullest extent
possible to pay the principal of and interest on general obligation
bonds. 238 In order to analyze the Bankruptcy Code consistently with
the state constitutional structure, the general obligation bond should
be viewed as having a statutory lien 239 on municipal property, and the

227. Id. § 1123(a)(3).
228. Id.

229. Id. §§ 901(a), 502(b).
230. Id. § 502(b)(2).
231. Id. § 1124(3)(A).
232. Id. § 506(a).
233. Id. § 552.
234. See notes 149-54 supra and accompanying text.
235. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. I 1978).
236. See In re Black Ranches, Inc., 362 F.2d 8 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
990 (1966); Textile Banking Co. v. Widener, 265 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1959).

237. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (b)(2) (Supp. I 1978).
238. Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563, 565-66 (9th Cir.
1940); Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379
N.Y.S.2d 978 (1975), rev'd, 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 847 (1976).
239. See notes 152-54 supra and accompanying text.
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interest2 40 devalue of the collateral necessary to allow post-petition
241
pends on the economic limit of the taxing power.
H. Confirmation of the Plan
After a plan is prepared, it may be confirmed by voting within
classes. A class of creditors has accepted a plan when a majority in
number, and two-thirds of creditors actually voting, approve the
plan.2 42 Except in limited circumstances, each class must either vote
on the plan or be grouped in a class which is not impaired and,
243
therefore, not required to vote.
If agreement with each cannot be achieved and the plan is subject
to the dissenting vote of an impaired class, confirmation may still
result under the "cram down" rules. These rules require a court to
confirm a plan2 44 if the petitioner so requests 245 and "if the plan does
not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to
each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not
accepted, the plan. '246 The nondiscrimination portion of the test
allows the court to consider the interrelation of priorities of claims
where one claim is subordinate to another. 247 If the legal rights of one
class are dependent upon those of another there should be consistent
248
treatment.
The requirement that the plan be "fair and equitable" is the more
substantive element of the test. Section 1129 has separate tests for a
dissenting impaired secured claim and a dissenting impaired unsecured claim. 249 Cram down may be applied to a dissenting impaired
unsecured class of claims if (i) the plan provides for members of the

240. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. H 1978).
241. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Spink, 145 Cal. App. 2d 568, 303 P.2d 46

(1956).
242. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 1126(c) (Supp. H 1978).

243. Id. §§ 901(a), 1129(a)(8).
244. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 304 (1977).
245. 11 U.S.C. §§ 941, 942, 943 (Supp. 11 1978).
246. Id. §§ 901(a), 1129(b)(1).
247. 124 CONG. REC. H11,104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
248. For example, if there is a subordinate debt under a trust indenture which
provides that the subordinated bonds will be payable from the flow of funds after
debt service and reserve requirements for the senior debt, the court could prevent a
plan that lowered the rate covenant from 125% to 105% and increased a reserve
requirement so that none of the 5% excess could flow down to the subordinated
bondholders.
249. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C) (Supp. H 1978), providing a fair and equitable test
for cram down of dissenting impaired ownership interests, such as stockholders, is
inapplicable to Chapter 9.
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class to receive or retain property that has a present value 250 equal to
the allowed amount of their unsecured claims, or (ii) the plan may
provide any treatment of the class as long as no class representing a
relatively junior claim to the dissenting class will retain or receive any
property. 251 The requirement is, in essence, the "absolute priority
rule 2 52 and provides that a plan is "fair and equitable" when the
impaired class receives full compensation for its allowed claims before
any junior class receives partial compensation.
Application of the fair and equitable doctrine to secured claims
requires modifying the concept of "allowed claims" to the extent that
the class elects the option set forth in Section 1111(b)(2) .253 This
section permits a class to be treated as fully secured even if the market
value of the collateral has fallen below the allowed amount of the
claim.2 5 4 In the cram down context, the election serves the purpose of
preventing a plan from satisfying a secured claim by taking advantage
of the depressed value of collateral that would ordinarily define the
extent of the secured claim under Section 506(a). For a plan to be
crammed down, however, one of three options must first be met. The
first alternative is for the class to retain the lien securing the claims of
the class to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims. Furthermore, the plan must provide for the class to receive deferred cash
payments aggregating at least the allowed amount of the claims and
such payments must have a present value equal to the value of the
255
collateral.
Returning to the illustration, assume the Electric Utility Authority
of City X files a petition listing the following claims:
Outstanding
Principal

Interest
Rate

Sec. 502
or 1111(b)
Allowed Claim

1983 Revenue Bonds

$30,000,000

11%

$30,000,000

1984 Revenue Bonds

$20,000,000

13%

$20,000,000

Unsecured claims

$1,000,000

-

$1,000,000

See. 506
Secured Claim
Revenues equal
to 125% of debt
service
Revenues equal
to 40% of debt
service

250. The present value calculation is as of the effective date of the plan.

251. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 11 1978).
252. See Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute PriorityDoctrine in CorporateReorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651 (1974).
253. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 1111(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
254. Id. § 1111(b)(2).

255. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. IV 1980).
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The Authority files a plan which diverts a portion of the revenues
securing the 1983 bonds from the funds under the 1983 trust indenture
to the funds under the 1984 trust indenture. The purpose of the plan is
for both the 1983 bondholders and the 1984 bondholders to receive,
during the period of scheduled amortization (assuming level debt
service over 25 years), all of the outstanding principal amount plus an
average interest rate of 10 % per year. The effect of the plan is to
allow both issues to be secured by revenues in an amount equal to debt
service, with the 1983 bonds losing their 25% coverage. The unsecured claims would not be paid anything. The class of 1983 bonds is
impaired and votes against the plan. The class of 1984 bonds is
impaired 5 6 but votes for the plan. The class of unsecured claims votes
against the plan.
In order for a plan to be confirmed at least one class must have
accepted the plan.2 57 A class that is not impaired is deemed to have
accepted the plan; 258 therefore, if the 1984 bond claims were not
considered impaired they could be counted as voting for the plan.
Under the absolute priority rule, the plan may be crammed down the
unsecured creditors because there are no more junior claims prior to
them.2 59 In compliance with the "fair and equitable" test, the 1983
bonds retain a lien on revenues to the extent of the allowed amount of
the claim because the allowed amount does not include unmatured
interest. 26 0 The principal of the 1983 bonds remains fully secured by
revenues. The plan also provides for cash payments totalling at least
26 1
the allowed amount of the claims, which is the principal amount.
The last part of the test is that the present value of the payments be
equal to the value of the collateral. This criterion is not satisfied
because the payout schedule coincides with the previously scheduled
payments of principal. The present value of the payout is at least
equal to the principal portion of the revenues, but because it is not
26 2
equal to 125% of debt service, the plan is not fair and equitable.
From the point of view of the securities lawyer, this result under the
Bankruptcy Code is the only reasonable conclusion. If the 1983 bonds

256. While it may not appear that the 1984 Bonds are impaired, the requirements
of § 1124 are not satisfied. For example, under § 1124(3), the allowed amount of the
claim is to be received, but not on the effective date of the plan. Id. § 1124(3).
257. Id. §§ 901(a), 1129(a)(10).
258. Id. §§ 901(a), 1126(f).
259. Id. §§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
260. Id.§ 502(b)(2).
261. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
262. If the payout of 'principal were over a shorter period of time than the
scheduled amortization, it is possible for the present value of the payout to equal the
present value of the collateral over the scheduled period.
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were subject to a plan destroying their collateral to benefit the claims
of other classes, the lawyer would be responsible for discussing in a
disclosure document the financial health of all outstanding classes of
secured claims no matter how irrelevant to the purposes and security
of the bonds being issued.
Two other options permit a plan to be cramned down to a secured
class of dissenting impaired creditors. One allows the sale of the
collateral with the lien being attached to the proceeds of the sale; in
all other respects, the tests in the first option apply. 263 The final
option is to have the plan provide for the class of secured claims by the
"realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such
claims. 2 1 4 Again there is no functional change from the first option.
The collateral may be sold free and clear of any liens provided the
bondholder is given security and a plan which fully satisfies the fair
26 5
and equitable doctrine.
IV. Disclosure Requirements Under the Bankruptcy Code
A. Disclosing the Plan
When the debtor files the plan with the court,266 the court gives
26 7
notice to all creditors of the date for the confirmation hearing.
Notice is given as well to the SEC 268 which may be heard on any issue
in a debt adjustment case but is not empowered to appeal any decision
made by the Bankruptcy Court.26 9 Congress considered requiring an
SEC report to creditors but chose instead to impose an obligation on
the debtor to make adequate disclosure to creditors of the context and
270
effect of the plan.
263. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). This test is a companion to 11 U.S.C. § 363 providing
for the disposition of collateral which is not incorporated into Chapter 9.
264. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
265. In re Muriel Holding Corp. 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935).
266. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (Supp. 11 1978).
267. Id. §§ 901(a), 1128.
268. "In this time of nationwide trading in municipal bonds, the committee feels
that the S.E.C. has a legitimate public investor role when the rights of security
holders are sought to be altered, even though the S.E.C. does not currently have any
role at the time of issue of the securities." H.R. REP. No. 686, 94 Cong., 2d Sess. 551
(1976).
269. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a), 1109 (Supp. 11 1978).
270. "The premise underlying the consolidated chapter 11 of this bill is the same
as the premise of the securities law. If adequate disclosure is provided to all creditors
and stockholders whose rights are to be affected, then they should be able to make an
informed judgment of their own, rather than having the court or the Securities and
Exchange Commission inform them in advance of whether the proposed plan is a
good plan. Therefore, the key to the consolidated chapter is the disclosure section."
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 226 (1977).
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When the court approves the disclosure statement, it sets a time
limit within which creditors may accept or reject the plan. The clerk
then mails to the creditors a copy of the plan, the disclosure statement,
the court opinion approving the disclosure statement, and notice of
the date for confirmation hearing.2 7I The purpose of the disclosure
requirement is to strike a balance between the form of disclosure that
would be required under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and the desirability of avoiding expensive, time-consuming procedures. 272 Congress assumed that the disclosure statement would be the product of
negotiation among committees of sophisticated investors273 and indenture trustees legally obligated to protect the interests of bondhold2 74
ers.
The relatively informal disclosure requirement is buttressed by the
substantive safeguards of the Bankruptcy Code in delineating the
boundaries of a negotiated plan. For example, the institutional investors could not negotiate a plan which allowed bondholders with more
than $100,000 invested to be paid in full while smaller investors were
paid 80% of their claims. 275 Similarly, the court must find the plan
to be in the best interests of creditors. 276 In corporate reorganizations, a Chapter 11 plan cannot give a creditor less than the creditor
would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 277 The test in municipal
debt adjustments requires a similar analysis as though a liquidation
27 1
were actually possible.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, neither an acceptance nor a rejection
of a plan may be solicited after the commencement of an action unless
at the time of solicitation the creditor is sent a copy of the plan, or a

271. Sugg. Int. B. Rule 3006.
272. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 226-31 (1977).
273. "[M]ost public debenture holders are neither weak nor unsophisticated investors. In most cases, a significant position of the holders of publicly issued debentures
are sophisticated institutions, acting for their own account or as trustees for investment funds, pension funds, or private trusts." 124 CONG. REC. H11,101 (daily ed.
Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Cong. Edwards).
274. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 439 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1971),
aft'd, 406 U.S. 416 (1972); Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 196 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1952);
In re North Amer. Acc. Corp. Sec. Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
275. Creditors in the same class must be treated equally. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a),
1123(a)(4) (Supp. 11 1978).
276. Id. § 943(b)(6).
277. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (Supp. 11 1978), is not incorporated into Chapter 9
since there cannot be a municipal liquidation.
278. Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415 (1943); H.R. REP. No.
686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 570 (1976).
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summary of the plan, and a written disclosure statement. 27 9 The
disclosure statement must be approved by the court as containing
adequate information after notice and a hearing.28 0 Adequate information is defined to be "of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is
reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor
and the condition of the debtor's books and records, that would enable
a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or
interests of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the
plan. 2 11 The test is the reverse of what is required for adequate
disclosure under the securities laws. The Bankruptcy Code does not
require an objective test of materiality based on the need for an
informed investment decision. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the
standard is the ability of the debtor to provide information: the worse
28 2
the books and records, the less the disclosure.
Section 1125 stresses this point by providing that "whether a disclosure statement contains adequate information is not governed by any
otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law . .
,,283 Section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act and Rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act may not be invoked.
In soliciting the plan the debtor and professional are protected from
fraud liability by a statutory "safe harbor" provision which states that
as long as the person acts in good faith and in compliance with the
Bankruptcy Code, such person will not be responsible for federal
284
securities laws violations.
The difficulty with this form of disclosure is its almost private
nature. If the class members have obtained adequate disclosure during
the negotiating process, the disclosure statement need not duplicate
the information.2 8 5 When the class, in turn, sells its bonds to other
members of the public, there is no disclosure document adequately
2 86
describing the restructuring of the debt.

279. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a), 1125(b) (Supp. 11 1978). The plan and the disclosure
statement are not required to be separate documents. In re Bel Air Assoc., Ltd., 4
Bankr. 168 (W.D. Okla. 1980).

280. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (Supp. 1 1978).
281. Id. § 1125(a).
282. "The section also permits a certain amount of flexibility based on the condition of the debtor and of his books and records. Frequently, the debtor's books will be
in a shambles at the time of bankruptcy, and reconstruction could be a long and
costly process." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 226-27 (1977).
283. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. H 1978).

284. Id. § 1125(e).

285. Id. § 1125(a)(2).
286. The "safe harbor" exemption from liability extends to sales of securities. 11
U.S.C. § 1125(e) (Supp. I 1978).
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B. The Issuance of Notes and Bonds under the Plan
There are four types of securities that a municipality is likely to
issue as part of a plan of debt adjustment: (i) short term obligations
payable on a priority basis as administrative expenses2 8 7 for the purpose of funding immediate operating needs; 288 (ii) notes or bonds to be
exchanged for outstanding notes or bonds to evidence the adjustment
of debt;289 (iii) bonds issued to refund existing bonds in accordance
with their terms or the terms of the plan;2 10 and (iv) bonds issued to
raise new capital. 2 9 ' The first security mentioned allows the municias
pality to issue unsecured debt which is payable on the same priority
2 92
If
proceedings.
adjustment
debt
the expenses of administering the
the municipality is unable to borrow on that basis, the court may
authorize a priority for the debt over all other administrative expenses 2 3 or provide a lien on property which is not otherwise subject
to a lien. 2 4 In extraordinary circumstances, the court may impose a
lien senior to existing liens, provided that adequate protection is given
29 5
to the existing lienholders.
In each type of indebtedness a question arises as to the form of
disclosure that is required to accompany the underwriting of the
29 6
issues. With respect to obligations not entitled to an exemption,
there is the further problem that the 1933 Act requires securities 297 be
registered under Section 5298 if they are offered or sold in a non-

287. Id. §§ 901(a), 507(a)(1), 503(b)(1).
288. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 566 (1976).
289. For example, the plan might provide that bonds of a class, with principal
payments being made annually, be exchanged for bonds with principal payments
postponed for five years, but bearing a slightly higher interest rate.
290. The refunding bonds are sold to new creditors and the proceeds used to retire
the debt of existing bondholders.
291. For example, the plan might call for the electric utility authority to embark
on a new profitable project to improve its ability to pay existing creditors. As an
inducement, the existing creditors transfer certain security to the new bondholders.
292. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), 503(b)(1) (Supp. I 1978).
293. Id. §§ 901(a), 364(c)(1).

294. Id. § 364(c)(2).

295. Id. § 364(d). Adequate protection is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 361 to provide
substitute cash or security on the theory that there is a taking of property within the
due process clause requiring compensation. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311
U.S. 273 (1940); cf. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974),
where the Court reasoned that facilitating borrowing to meet current expenses was
preserving secured creditors' collateral and therefore there was no taking.
296. See note 10 supra.
297. See note 9 supra.
298. See note 7 supra.

1982]

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

exempt offering involving an issuer, 299 underwriter 300 or dealer. 30 1
Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, exemption from
registration was based on both Section 3(a)(7), which provides an
exemption from registration for certificates issued by a receiver or by a
trustee in bankruptcy with the approval of the court, and Section
3(a)(10), which provides for the issuance of securities in a reorganization in exchange for existing claims. 302 The person reselling a security
issued in a plan of reorganization also would rely on Section 4(1),
which exempts from registration transactions by any person other
than an issuer, underwriter or dealer. 30 3 Typically the person receiving the securities was not an issuer or a dealer but an underwriter
operating pursuant to Section 2(11),304 a section which requires a
subjective evaluation of a person's intention to resell a security. The
problem for investors was that as soon as there was a market, the
typical investor would expect to resell. 3 05
If the security is exempt under either Section 3(a)(7) or Section
3(a)(10), the determination of underwriter status is immaterial because no registration is required regardless of the transaction. If,
however, the primary issue is based on a "private placement" transaction under Section 4(2),306 then the resale transaction of an unregis-

299. The term issuer is defined as "every person who issues or proposes to issue any
security ..
" 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(4) (1976).
300. The term "underwriter" is defined in § 2(11) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
77(b)(11) (1976), as follows:
[T]he term "underwriter" means any person who has purchased from an
issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with the
distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect
participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking; but
such term shall not include a person whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used in this paragraph the term
'issuer' shall include, in addition to an issuer, any person directly or
indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under
direct or indirect common control with the issuer.
301. The term 'dealer' is defined in § 2(12) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(12)
(1976), as follows:
[T]he term 'dealer' means any person who engages either for all or part of
his time, directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the
business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in
securities issued by another person.
302. 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(7) (1976).
303. Id. § 77(d).
304. See note 300 supra.
305. For a denial of a non-action request by an investor in this context, see [1973
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,318 (Mar. 2, 1973).
306. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).

590
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tered security by the investor must qualify under Section 4(1) as a
transaction by a person other than an underwriter, as defined by
Section 2(11).
In 1978, the SEC attempted to ameliorate the problem by promulgating Rule 148.307 Rule 148 provides that a person who acquires
securities under a plan shall not be deemed an underwriter if (i) the
volume of securities sold in any three month period is within a limit
generally not in excess of 1 % of the outstanding units; 30 8 (ii) there is
adequate current public information made available by the issuer; 30
and (iii) the transaction is conducted through "brokers" or "market
makers."
The Bankruptcy Code specifically exempts from the registration
requirements of Section 5 of the 1933 Act, except for sales by an
underwriter, the first two types of securities: securities issued for
administrative expenses and securities issued in exchange for allowed
claims.3 10 Section 1145(b) defines the resale to be by an underwriter
for purposes of Section 2(11) of the 1933 Act if the purchase by such
person is with "a view to distribution. ' 311 The Bankruptcy Code
rejects the efforts of the SEC in Rule 148 to establish an objective safe
harbor (or the more appropriate approach of simply declaring such a
person not to be an underwriter under Section 4(1) of the 1933 Act)
for the subjective test of intent.
The third and fourth types of securities are not exempted from
registration by reason of Section 1145. For those securities, exemption
307. Sec. Act. Rel. No. 5918, 43 Fed. Reg. 1449 (1978); Sec. Act Rel. No. 5979, 43
Fed. Reg. 54230 (1978); Sec. Act Rel. No. 6032 (1979).
308. Rule 148 permits sale of the greater of 1 % of the outstanding shares on other
units or the average weekly trading volume during the preceding four weeks.
309. The public information test is satisfied if the issuer is subject to the registration requirements of §12 of the 1934 Act and either of the periodic reporting requirements of § 13 or § 15(d) of the 1934 Act and is current with its filings. If the issuer is
not a reporting company the requirement is met if there is publicly available the Rule
15c 2-11 information. See Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 9310 (1971). Rule 15c 2-11 makes
it a fraudulent, manipulative and deceptive practice under §15(c)(2) of the 1934 Act
for a broker-dealer to effect transactions in securities unless it has on file specified
current information on the above reporting requirements. Rule 15c 2-11 is not
directly relevant to political subdivisions but it should be noted that § 15(c)(2) of the
1934 Act after referring to broker-dealers provides that "no municipal securities
dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce to effect any transactions in, or to induce or to attempt to induce the
purchase or sale of, any municipal security'in connection with which such municipal
securities dealer engages in any fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practices, or makes any fictitious quotation." See Rules G-I1, G-15, G-17, G-19 and G32 of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, CCH MSRB Manual, promulgated
under the authority of § 15B of the 1934 Act, for rules with respect to public
information.
310. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 1145(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
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from registration is dependent upon Section 3(a)(2),312 which in most
cases will provide an exemption for all four types of obligations incurred by political subdivisions. There may be situations, however, in
which the political subdivision intentionally issues taxable bonds in
violation of Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code 313 to take
advantage of short term profit potential on the reinvestment of proceeds not otherwise permitted by Section 103. 314 If the bonds are not
tax-exempt, they may not be exempt from registration under Section
3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act either.3 I5 Attempts to issue will create problems similar to those facing corporate issues, particularly with regard
to resales by statutory underwriters who consider themselves investors.
There remains the question of the type of disclosure required in
connection with the sale of securities pursuant to a plan of reorganization or debt adjustment. In the corporate context, securities may not
be issued to the public to raise new capital necessary to finance a plan
without registration. 316 The exemption from registration under Section 1145(a) is only for the limited purpose of exchanging new securities for existing claims or administrative expenses where a Section
1125 disclosure statement is deemed adequate. Public issues require
31 7
registration in the ordinary course under Section 5 of the 1933 Act.
In the limited context of a Section 1145(a) transaction, where a plan
calls for the issuance of securities in exchange for existing claims, the
only disclosure requirement is the delivery of a Section 1125 disclosure
statement. 3 1l If the purpose of the issue is to raise new money from
outside sources, the securities laws apply with their traditional disclosure standards. In the context of public finance, the pattern is similar.
The Section 1125 flexible disclosure statement may be used only with
the issuance of securities to persons being solicited for the acceptance
of the plan of debt adjustment. 319 The limited purpose of the Section
1125 disclosure statement is evidenced by the authorization of different disclosure statements for different classes. 320 Where cram down
procedures are being invoked under Section 1129(b), no disclosure
312. See note 10 supra.

313. I.R.C. § 103 (P-H 1981).
314.
1981).
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
1980).
320.

The reference is to the arbitrage restrictions set forth in I.R.C. § 103(c) (P-H
See text accompanying notes 18-27 supra.
SEC v. Granco Products Inc., 236 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text.
11 U.S.C. § 1145(a)(4) (Supp. 11 1978).
Id. § 1125(b). In re Northwest Recreational Activities, 4 Bankr. 43 (N.D. Ga.
11 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
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statement is necessary because the creditor is not in a position to make
a choice. 321 Accordingly, when the Bankruptcy Code provides that
the adequacy of a disclosure statement will not be determined under
nonbankruptcy law, 322 the exemption from the disclosure requirements of the securities laws extends only to the limited purposes for
which a Section 1125 disclosure statement is prepared.
Disclosure under Section 1125 will be substantively developed by
the bankruptcy court,3 2 3 and decisions there may inevitably reflect the
jurisprudence of disclosure under the securities laws.3 2 4 Where an
issue is being offered to the public by a political subdivision for
purposes of raising capital, however, the securities law standards of
disclosure under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act will be fully applicable.
The only gap in the interaction of the federal securities laws and the
Bankruptcy Code is in the instance where an adjustment of the debt
structure of an existing class of bonds approved by the class pursuant
to the lower disclosure standards of Section 1125 is involved. Immediately after approval the class begins selling the bonds to new investors
free from the restraints of underwriter status imposed by Section 2(11)
because of the Section 3(a)(2) exemption. The bonds are then sold to
investors inappropriate for Section 1125 disclosure who should have
the benefits of disclosure under Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act. In this
resale context, the control of disclosure will be made by the SEC and
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board pursuant to their ability
to regulate the conduct of municipal securities dealers under Section
325
15 of the 1934 Act.

321. In the Matter of Union County Wholesale Tobacco and Candy Co., 8 Bankr.
442 (D.N.J. 1981).
322. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. 11 1978).
323. In a Second Circuit decision the court emphasized the jurisdictional implications of § 1125(d) which "clearly establishes substantive preemption for the Bankruptcy Court as against the Securities Exchange Act ... but also requires that Court
to approve the disclosure statement as containing adequate information." In re
Guardian Mortgage Investors, 607 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1979).
324. For recent decisions of the bankruptcy court defining adequate disclosure
under § 1125, see In re Civitella, 14 Bankr. 151 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Adana Mortg.
Bankers, Inc., 14 Bankr. 29 (N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Stanley Hotel Inc., 13 Bankr. 926
(D. Col. 1981); In re Inforex, Inc., 10 Bankr. 497 (D. Mass. 1980); In re The William
F. Gable Co., 10 Bankr. 248 (N.D. W. Va. 1981); In re Western Management, Inc.,
6 Bankr. 438 (W.D. Ky. 1980) ("The purpose of a disclosure statement is to inform
equity holders and claimants, as fully as possible, about the probable financial results
of acceptance or rejection of a particular plan."); In re Hughes Marina Inc., 6
B.C.D. 978 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
325. See note 309 supra.
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V.

Conclusion

There are in excess of 20,000 political subdivisions with more than
50,000 separate issues of debt outstanding in the United States. 326 The
annual issuance of long term bonds of political subdivisions increased
from $17 billion in 1970 to $45 billion in 1980.327 In the period after
the New York fiscal crisis, short term indebtedness decreased from $29
billion in 1974 to $21 billion in each of the years 1976 through 1979
when it began to spiral upward to $34 billion in 1981.328
During the 1970's the proportion of new issues in the long term
market which were revenue bonds, as opposed to general obligation
bonds, rose from one-fourth to three-fourths of the bond market. 32
The revenue bond derives its security from the capability of the limited source of revenue to cover debt service, the statutory framework
that protects the lien on revenues, and the skill of attorneys to assure
330
that the intended security provisions are properly drafted.
Despite the present quantity of indebtedness, the ratio of short term
to long term indebtedness, and the limited sources of repayment
characteristics of revenue bonds, the debt of political subdivisions
generally is perceived to be among the safe investments. 331 For the
securities lawyer this suggests that the investor in securities of political
subdivisions is relying upon the integrity of the market as well as the
disclosures made with respect to a specific issue.
Reliance upon the integrity of the securities market suggests that the
market performs a substantial part of the valuation of a new security. 332 Market prices respond to information disseminated, assumptions made in the market, and information withheld. 333 If an issuer
has reason to believe that the market price of its securities is being
favorably influenced by assumptions made about the quality or safety
of the security being issued that are known to be absent for the

326. D. DARST, THE COMPLETE BOND BOOK 190 (1975).
327. MOODY'S MUNICIPAL & GOVERNMENT MANUAL a7 (1982).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. A general obligation bond derives its security from constitutional restrictions
on the amount and form of indebtedness and full faith and credit requirements that
the taxing power of the issuer be imposed to the extent necessary to raise sufficient
amounts for debt service.
331. DARST, supra note 326, at 195.
332. Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d
891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); In re LTV Sec. Litigation, 88
F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
333. Note, Fraud on the Market, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1154 (1982).
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particular offering, the nondisclosure of appropriate correcting information could be a violation of the federal securities laws. 334
In this Article there has been a discussion of a number of the
problems under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code which bear upon
federal securities law disclosure analysis. The following are the conclusions to be inferred:
(1)

In the ordinary issuance of debt by political subdivisions
where no threat of insolvency is reasonably perceived there
need be no standard disclosure of Bankruptcy Code consequences in the remote event of the filing of a Chapter 9
3 35
petition .

(2)

The conclusion set forth above is possible because there are
sufficient arguments under the Bankruptcy Code as developed
in this Article to reasonably conclude that the perceived integrity of public finance will be maintained where the Bankruptcy Code is applied.

(3)

If, as a result of decisions of the bankruptcy courts or other
federal courts, particular statutory schemes, or drafting decisions unique to a particular issue, the arguments favoring the
security of bondholders in this Article are not applicable,
disclosure of Bankruptcy Code consequences is necessary if the
market price is likely to reflect false assumptions about the
integrity of the issue.

(4)

As the potential threat of bankruptcy increases, the attention
to Bankruptcy Code disclosures should increase, and those
responsible for disclosure will be required to consider the
materiality of discussion in the disclosure documents of the
problems under Chapter 9.

334. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
335. If a financing is designed to achieve specific results in a bankruptcy context,
even where there is no potential threat, an explanation of those purposes and anticipated consequences is appropriate.

